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THE PRESENT STATUS OF COLLECTIVE CONTRACTS
IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM*
Arthur Lenhoff t

C

AN it be that less than a score of years has elapsed since Schlesinger v. Quinto 1 pointed out the difference between employment
contracts and collective contracts? And yet in that short period the
various objections recurrently raised regarding the enforceability of
these contracts, such as lack of consideration and of mutuality as well
as the dictate of the "personal service" rule, came to be disregarded.
At a time when employers are not only obliged to bargain collectively
but also, after reaching an agreement, to reduce it to writing,2 reminiscences of the "custom" doctrine 8 must, indeed, resemble the frozen
sounds in Munchausen's posthorn. From a review of the vast number
of reported cases of more recent origin and particularly those of the
decade just past, one can easily glean three characteristic features of
collective contracts. First, they neither create the employment relationship nor do they deal exclusively with it. Second, their terms present
a set of rules with respect to employment relationships/ a phenomenon
similar to that demonstrated in insurance law by the standard forms
of policies enacted as a result of legislative delegation. Here, however,

* The writer wishes to acknowledge the great assistance of Mr. Mark De Wolfe
Howe, Dean of the University of Buffalo School of Law, and of Mr. Louis Spector of
the bar of New York City, in the final revision of this article.
This article was completed in the fall of 1940.
Assistant Professor of Law and Librarian, University of Buffalo Law School;
formerly Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Austria. D.U.J., University of
Vienna. Author of various legal books and articles published abroad.-Ed.
1 117 Misc. 735, 192 N. Y. S. 564 (1921), affd. 201 App. Div. 487, 194
N. Y. S. 401 (1922), preceded in time with respect to the lack-of-mutuality argument
by Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Stoomvart Maatschappij v. Stevedores' & Longshoremen's Benevolent Society, (D. C. La. 1920) 265 F. 397.
2 H.J. Heinz Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 320.
8 For various cases based on this doctrine-that an employee's agreement with a
union cannot be a binding contract but can only establish usages and custom5-ee
the illuminating article by Rice, "Collective Labor Agreements in American Law,"
44 HARV. L. REv. 572 (1931), the thorough study by Witmer, "Collective Agreements in the Courts," 48 YALE L. J. 195 (1938), and the writings listed in the
comment, 38 MxcH. L. REV. 516 (1940).
~ If contracts entered into by employer and union adopt a closed-shop scheme, but
omit any provision with respect to wages or other working conditions, the lack of this
requisite for a collective contract may even affect its validity as a contract. See Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 104 F.
(2d) 49.
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the analogy ends, for a third characteristic of collective agreements is
that they themselves create rights and impose duties. For and upon
whom? When one finds the answer to this question, one has perhaps
come an important step nearer to the solution of the problems concerning the impact of collective contracts on the employment relationship.

I
ENFORCEABILITY OF COLLECTIVE CONTRACTS BY OR
AGAINST THE

UNION

It is obvious that any construction which reduces the union's part
in contracting to, at best,5 a merely representative function makes superfluous any further examination of the problem. Such a restricted interpretation would result in the annihilation of any right of the collective group and would serve to throw into gear all the familiar
doctrines concerning lack of mutuality, failure of consideration, etc.
Closed-shop clauses of any legal type, provisions granting a preference
to union men, contractual rules in respect to the arbitration of disputes
as well as terms eliminating any resort to the use of lockouts or of a
shutdown or runaway throughout the duration of the contract would
be denied any legal sanction. The denial that the union has any rights
and duties under the collective contract means that there is no remedy
given for even the most evident violation of the terms of the contract
by the employer. Failure of legal protection prompts the workers to
take the law into their own hands.
5 By the "usage" doctrine no legal function at all exists. See the decisive words in
Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., 180 Mo. 241 at 250, 79 S. W. 136 (1904): "the
Miners' Union, as an organization, can not make a contract for its individual members. • • ." There were also many courts which relied on various doctrines of agency,
with the union officers filling the role of agents in some cases, and in others the union
itself. Support for these doctrines was found in the fact that the legal effect of a collective agreement was dependent on whether it had been expressly or impliedly authorized by those affected by it. Typical of that doctrine is the case of W. A. Snow Iron
Works v. Chadwick, 227 Mass. 382, II6 N. E. 801 (1917). There were neither pay
rates nor hours nor any other employment condition in issue, the only matter in dispute being whether or not there was an oral agreement between plaintiff employer
and the union providing that the union supply labor according to the plaintiff's needs.
Said the court: "The officers of the union could not create either by word or condu!:t
a binding bargain in behalf of the members of their union to furnish labor to be
performed individually, unless they had been authorized expressly or impliedly by the
members in some form sufficient to show mutuality of will and consent." 227 Mass.
at 390-391.

1941}

COLLECTIVE CONTRACTS

llll

A. Types of Rights and Duties of Union
There are many decisions indicating the patent unreality of the
restrictive analysis of collective contracts. In Schwartz v. Cigar Makers'
International Union 6 the union relied on a clause by which the company, in consideration of an acceptance by the union of a reduced scale
of wages, promised employment to union members only up to the shop
capacity for a year. The union, alleging breach of this clause by the
company, prayed in vain for an injunction ordering the company to
employ only members, after the company had asked for an injunction
against labor disturbances arising from that breach. The court refused
to grant relief to the union under its contract on the ground that the
union was not a real party to the contract but was only a representative or agent of the individual employees. No individual member of
the union was, of course, entitled either to damages or to employment,
for none could prove that had there been no breach he would have
been employed. 7 The union, however, was highly interested in placing
its members up to the plant's capacity, for employment implies maintenance of membership and the union's funds in the war chest need not
be touched. 8 Furthermore, a successful appeal of the union to nonmembers increases its membership. Accordingly its economic power increases to the same extent by which it would decrease were its contracts found to be unenforceable. And yet in the Schwartz case the court
felt satisfied by the legalism which removed the union as an interested
and effective party to the contract.
Nowadays it is common for unions to contract a checkoff system for
the payment of membership dues with the companies, and decisions as
well as statutes 9 admit the legality of the checkoff practice, contracted
6 219 Mich. 589, 189 N. W. 55 (1922). This case arose out of the same facts
as Schwartz v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 217 Mich. 384, 186 N. W. 522 (1922). The
same conclusion was reached in Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 49 Wyo. 22, 5 2
P. (2d) 404 (1935).
7 The court in the Schwartz cases (note 6, supra) proceeded upon the idea that
collective contracts are employment contracts. In so doing, it referred to the lack of
mutuality as nullifying any claim for specific performance. But the reader can infer
from the opinion that an "injured" person suing for damages could hope for little
chance of success.
8 Reasoning similar to that may be seen in the well-known case of Texas & N. 0.
R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, (C. C. A. 5th, 1929) 33 F. (2d) 13 (injunction was granted to the Brotherhood against the company, which had sought to induce
its employees to form a pseudo-union).
9 E.g., Wis. Stat. (1939), § lII.06 (1-i) (on individual authorization valid for
one year only), or N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1940), Penal Law, §
962(4) (checko.ff for the benefit of a duly constituted labor organization, exempt from
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with bona fide 10 ·unions. This system contributes to the :financial stability of the unions and relieves their intercourse with the members
from burdensome and expensive concomitants. According to the different views of the grounds on which the individual employee in his
capacity as union member is held bound by provisions of the collective
contract, his authorization of the application of that clause to his earnings may or may not be held a prerequisite to its operation.11 Any chalthe sanctions against kick-back of wages). The legality of checkoff provisions (held to be
a voluntary assignment by the employee of so much of his wages as corresponded to
his union dues) was recognized by the courts, in Gasaway v. Borderland Coal Corp.,
(C. C. A. 7th, 1921) 278 F. 56 at 65; International Organization, U. M. W. A.
v. Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1927) 18 F. (2d) 839
at 850; National Labor Relations Board v. J. Greenbaume Tanning Co., (C. C. A.
7th, 1940) l IO F. (2d) 984; and in Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) I II F. (2d) 340. Express statutory provision is needed to outlaw checkoff clauses. Such is the case, as to such clauses in collective contracts which come under § 2 (4) of the 1934 amendment to the Railway
Labor Act, 48 Stat. L. 1187 (1934), 45 U.S. C. (1934), § 152 (4); Brotherhood of
Railroad Shop Crafts v. Lowden, (C. C. A. 10th, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 458. Other situations might arise in which the checkoff system imposed upon the employees is merely
another way of illegally interfering with the employee's rights to self-organization. A
satisfactory test for that may be found in many orders of the National Labor Relations
Board; see note Io, infra.
10 The National Labor Relations Board proceeds upon the principle that a checkoff
agreement with a company-ridden union merely illustrates the other side of the pressure exerted upon the employees to have them disregard their right to self-organization
and that it is therefore void even if approved by the members. Matter of Heller Bros.
Co., 7 N. L. R. B. 646 (1938); Matter of West Kentucky Coal Co., District 23,
IO N. L. R. B. 88 (1938); Matter of J. Greenbaum Tanning Co., I l N. L. R. B.
300 (1939); Matter of McGoldrick Lumber Co., 19 N.L.R.B., No. 93 (1940). See
also Blossom Products Corp., 20 N.L.R.B., No. 35 (1940). An examination of the conclusions drawn by the board with respect to the reimbursement of the amounts involved
to the employees, and of the question whether the dissolution of the sham-union frees the
employer of this burden, would fall beyond the scope of this article. See National Labor
Relations Board v. J. Greenbaume Tanning Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 110 F. (2d)
984. But the case of Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
(C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 111 F. (2d) 340, in which the court rejected that general
proposition in the board decree, and relied on the particular facts of the case involved,
is not without merit even though it may justify a checkoff practiced by an organization
which the board has held to be dominated by the company. Likewise, the federal
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Western Union Tel Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 992, speaking through
Justice Learned Hand, pointed out the fallacy underlying the reasoning of the board,
which overlooks the fact that unfair practices alone must not be held of themselves to
inflict pecuniary damage upon each worker. Only actual evidence can establish that such
a practice proximately damages a worker.
11 The collective contract itself may prescribe such individual authorization. Such
was the case in the contract in Christiansen v. Local 680, Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, 126 N. J. Eq. 508, IO A. (2d) 168 (1940). Upon the employee's withdrawal
from union, he may revoke his authorization. See Fisher v. Stevens Coal Co., (Pa.
1941) 17 A. (2d) 642.
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lenge of the right of the union to claim to be the real party to the performance of the checkoff provisions of the contract would not, however, be invalidated by the recognition of the employee's individual
rights.
Consistent with the tendency just described is the current of recent
precedents recognizing that the union may be given the right by the
contract to enjoin the employer from a lockout of the employees or
even from a mere threat of a lockout. 12 In actions brought by unions,
employers have been ordered to put back to work all the union members whom they had locked out in violation of the contract, and in the
case of a runaway employer to move back all the machinery within
the agreed area. 18 Prayers of unions for enforcement of preference
clauses or closed-shop provisions of all varieties u and for cooperation
by the company in the establishment of an agreed adjustment board
or board of arbitration for the settlement of suits and of labor disputes 15
are being granted by the courts.
12 Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N. Y. S. 31 I (1928). Here a
collective contract with a closed-shop clause prohibited any strike or lockout during the
period of contract. During this time the employer, however, threatened to shut down
the plant, to remove it to Lynbrook, Long Island, and to operate it there on an
open-shop basis.
18
Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 162 Misc. 177, 292 N. Y. S. 898 (1936)
(facts analogous to those in the case in note IZ, supra, with the difference that here
the company had accomplished what was only threatened there). The decision relied
upon Farulla v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 155 Misc. 262, 279 N. Y. S. 228 (1935).
An earlier decision in the same case is reported in 153 Misc. 738, 277 N. Y. S. 47
(1934). There the union was held entitled to enforce specifically the closed-shop provision of the collective contract. Defendant's wrongful placing upon the workers of
additional duties not contemplated in the contract was also forbidden, and all other
provisions in respect of the contract were enforced in favor of the union.
H Rihner v. Racso Butter & Egg Co., 135 Misc. 616, 238 N. Y. S. 132 (1929)
(injunction restraining defendant from hiring anyone but members of plaintiff union
granted); Murphy v. Ralph, 165 Misc. 335, 299 N. Y. S. 270 (1937) (injunction
to compel compliance with closed-shop clause granted); Harper v. Local Union No.
520, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 48 S. W. (2d) 1033 (interlocutory order granting an
injunction restraining the defendant from employing persons other than union members affirmed). See also Weber v. Nasser, (Cal. App. 1930) 286 P. 1074, affd. 210
Cal. 6o7, 292 P. 637 (1930), which involved a clause providing for the maintenance
of a minimum size orchestra, the installation of talking devices notwithstanding. When
members of the Allied Amusement Industries, which represented the employers, proceeded to discharge their orchestras, the union brought suit to enforce the performance
of that clause. Judgment dismissing the action was reversed. The prerequisites and
limitations of this type of agreement are not material here. See Despres, "The Collective Agreement for the Union Shop," 7 UN1v. Cm. L. REv. 24 (1939).
15
It is possible that the question of the enforceability of arbitration clauses might
be answered in more than one way within the same jurisdiction. For a distinction is
drawn between the arbitration of controversies which are the subject of suit, such as
questions of interpretation and application of contract provisions, and the arbitration
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The right of the union, moreover, to recover what damages it may
have sustained, in an action at law, by the breach of contract is recognized by the New York courts.16 Incidentally, the unions, as was said
in one case "have more at stake to preserve under this [collective] contract than the sum of the damages occasioned by the unlawful discharge of all the members" or by the failure to employ union members.11 All of this is a 'consequence of .an unequivocal interpretation of
the collective contract or of a contract "between the organization or
involved in the establishment of new standards when new terms are in dispute. In
addition to that difference between "disputes on rights" and "disputes on interests,"
the problem of enforceability is handled differently in the states. See, e.g., N. Y. Civil
Practice Act (1937), § 1450, as compared with 2 CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 550
(1932). The amendment of 1940, N. Y. Laws (1940), c. 851, to the Civil Practice
Act, § 1448, expressly extends the judicial enforceability heretofore limited to arbitration "on rights," to provisions "in a written contract between a labor organization,
as defined in subdivision five of section seven hundred one of the labor law, and employer or employers or association or group of employers to settle by arbitration a controversy or controversies thereafter arising between the parties to tke contract including
but not restricted to controversies dealing with rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other terms and conditions of employment.•••" (Italics supplied.)
By Minn. Laws (1939), c. 439, Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1940), § 9513, this also
holds true in every controversy which can be the subject of a labor dispute within
the meaning of the Minnesota Labor Relations Act. Other legislatures, however, even
exclude those disputes which are the subject of civil action from arbitration if they are
connected with collective contracts. E.g., Ariz. Code Ann. (1939), § 27-309; and
Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 95 P. (2d) 49 (1939). In accord, Ohio
Gen. Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1940), § 12148-1(a); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1937), § 1280 (excluding contracts pertaining to labor); but see the very recent
case of Levy v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. (2d) 692, 104 P. (2d) 770 (1940), noted
54 HARV. L. REv. 500 (1941) and 29 CAL. L. REv. 411 (1941). To the same effect
as Ohio, N. H. Laws (1929), c. 147, § 1, R. I. Gen. Laws (1938), c. 475, § 1, and
Ore. Comp. Laws (1940), § II-601. Aside from statutory restriction, the validity of
such arbitration clauses in collective contracts is no longer' disputed. Goyette v. C. V.
Watson Co., 245 Mass. 577, 140 N. E. 285 (1923). Space does not permit going into
more detail. On the question whether the arbitration clause of a collective contract
might be asserted in an action by an individual member, see the text just preceding
not 46, infra.
16 Farulla v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 155 Misc. 262, 279 N. Y. S. 228 (1935),
where the union was held entitled to damages sustained from defendant's deliberate
breach of collective contract; the court referred the issue to a referee to determine
the amount of damages. Dictum to the like effect is, to be found in Nevins, Inc. v.
Kasmach, 279 N. Y. 323, 18 N. E. (2d) 294 (1938), and Dubinsky v. Blue Dale
Dress Co., 162 Misc. 177, 292 N. Y. S. 898 (1936) (the damages sustained by members are to be computed). The plan of reorganization of Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc.,
as approved by the court, provided for the adjustment of the union's claim arising
when the collective contract was terminated under § 77 B of the Bankruptcy Act. See
In re Ralph A. Freundlich, 2 N. L. R. B. 802 at 807 (1937), and note in 53 HARv.
L. REV. 1360 at 1363 (1940).
17 Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631 at 633, 227 N. Y. S. 311 (1928).
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group as such and the employer" 18 or groups of employers. If the
contract has been violated by the latter, all the usual remedial incidents
to a breach of contract may appropriately be claimed by the union.
To make these remedies available to unions is only to balance an account in which, at the instance of employers, unions and their officers
were enjoined by judicial process from calling or assisting a strike 19
or from engaging in other concerted actions in violation of obligations
assumed by the unions in their collective contracts. The consequence of
this whole development is the long delayed, but now quite general
acceptance, of the proposition that "such contracts have mutual obligations binding upon both parties and enforceable in equity." 20
Having discussed the rights of the union, let us inquire into its
obligations. Its obligations arising from the collective agreement must
always be distinguished from those obligations which are imposed upon
each employee as incidents of the employment relation irrespective of
any individual contract. The acts commanded or forbidden in the
union's contract are related to the conduct of its own members collectively. To say that, however, is not to decide the question whether the
individual member may or may not derive individual rights from the
collective contract. That subject will be dealt with subsequently, but it
must always be clearly kept in mind that those rights of the individual
employee are by no means identical with the relations 21 between the
18
Harper v. Local Union No. 520, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 48 S. W. (2d) 1033
at 1040. In Goyette v. C. V. Watson Co., 245 Mass. 577, 140 N. E. 285 (1923),
the Massachusetts court had already pointed out that not the plaintiff (member) but
only the union as such might claim damages (which were waived) or specific performance after breach of a closed-shop agreement.
19
Grassi Contracting Co. v. Bennett, 174 App. Div. 244, 160 N. Y. S. 279
(1916); Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Stoomvart Maatschappij v. Stevedores' & Longshoremen's Benevolent Society, (D. C. La. 1920) 265 F. 397; A. R. Barnes & Co. v.
Berry, (C. C. Ohio, 1907) 156 F. 72; Nevins, Inc. v. Kasmach, 279 N. Y. 323, 18
N. E. (2d) 294 (1938); Gilchrist Co. v. Metal Polishers, etc., Union, (N. J. Ch.
1919) 113 A. 320. Whether or not the federal and state "anti-injunction" acts (forbidding injunctions against strikes arising from labor disputes) conflict with the policy
of granting specific performance of agreements prohibiting recourse to strike is beyond
the scope of this article. A possible hint to the answer may be found in the text infra,
referring to notes 36 and 38.
20
See Weber v. Nasser, (Cal. App. 1930) 286 P. 1074 at 1077, affd. 210 Cal.
607, 292 P. 637 (1930). Greater City Master Plumbers Assn. v. Kahme, (S. Ct.
1937) 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 589 (on request of the employers' association, as one party of
the collective agreement, the other party, the union, which called a strike in violation
of the provisions of the contract, was directed to perform the provisions) •
21
There is logically no need for a distinction between rights and duties because they are "really but two names for the same thing" or two aspects of the same

1116

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

union and the employer created by the collective contract. This relation ~s the result of mutual promises; performance of the union's
promise does not consist of the proper acts of its individual members;
performance of the employer's promise demands something more than
that he act in the right way towards each individual employee.
It is debatable whether a necessarily implied term 22 of any collective contract is that throughout the period of its effectiveness a recourse
to any concerted action is barred or whether an express clause to that
effect is required. It is arguable that the essential consideration which
leads the employer to assume obligations to the union is an obligation
on the union's part to forbear from any act which will be injurious to
the employer and inconsistent with the express terms of the contract.28
We have been told in a careful and thorough opinion 24 that the collective contract must be given a reasonable construction, no matter how
inartistically it may be drawn, and notwithstanding its outward lack of
any obligation imposed upon the union. Such a contract, buttressed by
reasonable implications, produces reciprocal obligations. Often, there is
no express promise on the part of the union to force its members to
comply with the terms and conditions prescribed in the collective contract. A reasonable construction, however, is that the union is obliged
to abstain from any act which would be in conflict with any of the terms
of the contract. Such a construction of the contract would mean only
that the union is obliged to do everything which it may do under its
constitution and by-laws to bring about compliance by union members
with those terms and conditions.25 Many courts in this country have
relationship. Cf. TERRY, SoME LEADING PRINCIPLES OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw 88
(1884). But even though rights and duties are interwoven in collective contracts, the
narrow interpretation given the declaratory judgment statutes (which limit their
jurisdiction to the determination of "rights and other legal relations") may necessitate
the continuance of such a distinction.
22 See Harper v. Local Union No. 520, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 48 S. W. (2d)
1033 (where prior notice of any demand is agreed upon in the contracts, the agreement may be interpreted as a promise to forbear from any concerted action except upon
due notice given the employer); Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 95 P.
(2d) 49 (1939).
23
" • • • one of its considerations was lodged in the purpose and intent to prevent strikes•••." H. Blum & Co. v. Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426 at 437, 155 N. E.
154 (1926). See also Harper v. Local Union No. 520, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 48
S. W. (2d) 1033; Gilchrist Co. v. Metal Polishers, etc., Union, (N. J. Ch. 1919) 113
A. 320 (1919).
24
Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Stoomvart Maatschappij v. Stevedores' & Longshoremen's Benevolent Society, (D. C. La. 1920) 265 F. 397.
25
This point has already been stressed in Schlesinger v. Quinto, I I 7 Misc. 735,
192 N. Y. S. 564 (1921), affd. 201 App. _Div. 487, 194 N. Y. S. 401 (1922).
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already reached this result. 26 In doing so they have accepted the same
general view towards collective contracts as have the courts of continental Europe. Reason and not force is to hold sway in industrial relations. The essential purpose of the collective contract-maintenance
of industrial peace during the life of the contract-may be achieved
when courts acknowledge that the agreement has the status of a contract. 21 It is for the union to look after the maintenance of standards
established by the contract even though an express promise on the part
of the union may be lacking. In this regard the collective contract supplies an excellent example of writing "instinct with an obligation."
The other party of the contract can require the union "to do its duty."
This obligation cannot be itemized into so and so many obligations of
each individual member.
The individuals as such are not able to a:ffect the result except by
acting collectively and that, in the end, means that this kind of obligaTherein, a so-called "multiple employer" collective contract was involved. The conclusions which that decision reached with respect to the union's obligations are likewise applicable when employer's associations are the contracting parties. For convenience
and simplicity the writer mentions only the "one-employer contract."
26
See, for example, Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 95 P. (2d)
+9 (1939); Prebl v. Architectural Iron Workers' Union, 260 111. App. 435 (1931);
Greater City Master Plumbers Assn. v. Kahme, (S. Ct. 1937) 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 589
(see note 20, supra); Grassi Contracting Co. v. Bennett, 174 App. Div. 244, 160
N. Y. S. 279 (1916); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, II8 N. E.
214 (1918) (not a labor case); Gilchrist Co. v. Metal Polishers, etc., Union, (N. J.
Ch. 1919) u3 A. 320; Blum & Co. v. Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426, 155 N. E. 154
(1926); Harper v. Local Union No. 520, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 48 S. W. (2d)
1033; Wilson v. Airline Coal Co., 215 Iowa 855, 246 N. W. 753 (1933). The
English Court of Appeals, although denying the collective agreement any legal effect,
hit upon a substitutional device for keeping the union to its promise. For illustration,
see South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., [1905] A. C. 239.
There the union violated the collective agreement by ordering four "stop" days. The
employment contracts of individual workers were terminable by either party on one
month's notice. Thus, the peg was found on which to hang the concept that the
union was responsible in tort as a third person, causing the breach of employment contracts. The House of Lords could hardly have chosen such a way out in the usual
case of employments terminable at will. Thus, when unions were subsequently rendered
immune from responsibility for inducing the breach of employment contracts (Trade
Disputes Act of 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47, § 3), no great sacrifice by the employers was
involved.
27
See National Labor Relations Board v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., (C. C. A.
4th, 1940) I IO F. (2d) 632. It is stated there (p. 638): "The trade agreement thus
becomes • • • the industrial constitution of the enterprise. • • ." But if this language
is more than a metaphor, it is incorrect, since a constitution, being no contract, continues to operate independently of the wills of the persons who created it. A contract on
the other hand remains, as we shall see, within the control of the union and the
employer who created it.
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tion created by the collective contract is an obligation of the union.
There can be no doubt that the doctrine of the first Coronado case 28
has promoted the knowledge of the distinction between collective
obligations and individual obligations in labor law. 29 The denial of the
liability of unincorporated associations organized for purposes other
than pecuniary profit, whether that denial be based upon a repudiation 30
of the doctrine of the Coronado case or upon the lack of statutory command, 31 may bring about many important results. 32 Those results are
28
United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42
S. Ct. 570 (1922).
.
29
The language used by the court, speaking through Taft, C. J., is broader than
the commentator in 38 CoL. L. REV, 454 at 458 (1938) will concede. There is more
than a procedural aspect to the relations established by the union. The court adverts
to the liability of a union, aside from that raised by the Sherman Act, and to the
rule in some jurisdictions wherein the union has been held "an artificial person in its
closely united action and function." Chief Justice Taft's opinion points particularly
to "the union's large funds" and "its assets," which "are subject to execution." The
trend of the cases indicates that even the funds of an unincorporated union are doubtless
subject to any legal claims. See 2 NAT, LAwY. Gu1LD Q. 267 at 271 (1940).
30
See, for example, Cahill v. Plumbers, Gas, etc., Local 93, 238 Ill. App. 123
(1926); in accord, Johnston v. Albritton, IOI Fla. 1290, 134 So. 566 (1931), and
Malloy v. Carroll, 287 Mass. 376, 191 N. E. 661 (1934), etc. Contra: WesternUnited Dairy Co. v. Nash, 293 Ill. App. 162, 12 N. E. (2d) 47 (1937).
81 Statutes patterned after the New York law, N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney,
Supp. I 940), General Associations Law, §§ 12, 13, originally enacted as § 1919,
Code of Civil Procedure, are construed by the courts to mean that in an action against
the union it ought to be alleged, at least, that the action is brought against all the
members. See Schouten v. Alpine, 215 N. Y. 225, 109 N. E. 244 (1915); Feinberg
v. Basson, (S. Ct. 1938) 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 809-; Rodier v. Fay, (S. Ct. 1938) 7
N. Y. S. (2d) 744. Where the union acts as contracting party, in the same way, for
example, that an employer acts toward his secretary as an employee, his capacity to
sue and to be sued is no longer questioned. See Irwin v. Foley, 259 App. Div. 156,
18 N. Y. S. (2d) 185 (1940). There, from the very outset, the collective character
of the liability is evident. On the other hand, the second type of statutory provision,
modeled after the Texas statute perhaps-Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 19-36), art. 6133
--or the Connecticut act-Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930), §§ 5471, 5797-must be con;sidered to render unincorporated unions entirely vulnerable to suit. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (1938), § 17b, make the capacity of unions to sue and be
sued dependent upon the law of the state in which the district court is held; but
that capacity is recognized without any regard to the state law when the issue concerns the enforcement of "a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws
of the United States." This exception might cover a number of suits, because those
arising out of a collective contract made in accordance with § 9 of the National Labor
Relations Act come within its scope. See note following.
82
This is not applicable when the question is whether federal jurisdiction based
on "diversity'~ may be invoked in the dispute. This capacity on the part of an unincorporated union to be sued does not render the citizenship of its members unimportant,
when "diversity'' is the prerequisite for jurisdiction to be assumed. See International
Allied Printing Assn. v. Master Printers Union of New Jersey, (D. C. N. J. 1940)
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not, however, of immediate relevance to our problem-the problem
whether there are created by the collective contract certain obligations
over and above those which are immediately involved in the employment relation. That such obligations exist can be clearly seen from
their nature, for they are not performable by the individual employee
as such and he cannot be compelled to fulfill them. 88 Those courts
which deny the capacity of unions to sue or to be sued will hardly come
to the conclusion that the obligations which bind the members collectively and which are the backbone of collective bargaining lack any
enforceability. The nature of such rights and duties would, unless the
legal entity of the union is recognized by statute or by decision, require 84 the joinder of all members whose place, in equity, the class
may take. A class suit would not be consistent with the holding that
each individual member may base a claim upon rights created by the
collective contract. But who will challenge the statement that all cases
decided in the last decade clearly evidence the propriety of the class
action whenever the union's rights are to be enforced? 85
Collective bargaining, emerging from a period of infrequent application into a position of phenomenal prominence after labor became
a decisive political factor, found the legal profession unprepared. It
was natural, therefore, in dealing with this new appearance to fall into
the easygoing doctrines hitherto applied to individual transactions.
34 F. Supp. 178. So far, the federal courts have assumed jurisdiction only when each
member of the union has a citizenship different from that of the plaintiff. See Russell
v. Central Labor Union, (D. C. 111. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 412, which makes a clear distinction between the "Coronado" doctrine by which the union is recognized as an
entity apart from its individual members and capable of being sued, and the opposite
doctrine which grants it no such recognition. See also Levering & Garrigues Co. v.
Morrin, (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) 61 F. (2d) 115. The consideration may be different
with respect to other problems, such as that of jurisdiction and service of summons,
when a national union is involved. See Christian v. International Association of Machinists, (D. C. Ky. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 481, for one view, and Operative Plasterers', etc.,
International Assn. v. Case, (App. D. C. 1937) 93 F. (2d) 56, for the other. But
those questions are not pertinent here.
88
This distinction is the basis of the reasoning in Illinois Central R. R. v. Moore,
(C. C. A. 5th, 1940) 112 F. (2d) 959 (contractual aspect of closed-shop and arbitration clauses contrasted with obligations arising from employment). This case has been
reversed by the Supreme Court, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 754, on different grounds.
84
The individual employee would hardly be given standing to sue with respect
to this class of rights. The expression "collective" rights in that sense is to be found,
for example, in Long v. Van Osdale, (Ind. App. 1940) 26 N. E. (2d) 69.
85
See, e.g., Weber v. Nasser, (Cal. App. 1930) 286 P. 1074, affd. 210 Cal.
607, 292 P. 637 (1930) (action brought by members to enforce a provision concerning the number of workers to be employed).
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Small wonder then that under such a confused interpretation it took
much time to find a distinction between such an agreement and the
individual employment contract and, incredible as it may seem, even
more time to identify the contracting parties as obligees and obligors.
Contractual rights and duties arising out of the collective contract
are one thing; the effect of the existence of a collective contract on the
individual employment relationship is another. As soon as the courts
recognized that the "collective contract" had to be kept sharply apart
from the employment contract and that it was nevertheless an enforceable contract different by not a hair-breadth from any other contract,
that last step had to follow as a matter of course. Here, again, both
parties indicated a desire to be fully enlightened. The employers became aware of the fact that the clause of a collective contract which
outlaws strikes for the duration of the contract can, under the Clayton
Act and under the anti-injunction statutes, be enforced only upon
the ground of a contractual obligation imposed expressly or implicitly
upon the union in the collective agreement. Said the New York
Supreme Court in Greater City Master Plumbers' Association v.
Kahme: 86
"Neither can it be said that an injunction compels the men in
the union to return to work. They individually may do as they
see fit. An injunction enjoins the union from calling or continuing
a strike in violation of its contractual obligation.•.."

In Uneeda Credit Clothing Stores v. Briskin 37 issue was taken as to
whether, at the company's request, picketing could be enjoined because
of the connection of that concerted action with a strike called by the
defendant union in violation of such an antistrike clause. The union had
also ignored the arbitration clause of the contract. The court placed
its weight behind the views expressed in the decision just quoted: 88
"Both parties to a collective bargaining agreement must be treated
36 (S. Ct. 1937) 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 589 at 592. The facts are adequately set out
in the text. Likewise see Nevins, Inc. v. Kasmach, 279 N. Y. 323, 18 N. E. (2d)
294 (1938) (strike called by the union during the period in which no strike or lockout should be called according to the collective agreement; upon request of the employer asking for specific performance an injunction was granted). In accord, J. I.
Hass Co. v. McNamara, (S. Ct. 1940) 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 441 (local unon enjoined
from any interference with workers willing to go back to work, upon the ground that
the calling of the strike constituted a breach of the collective contract and, for this
reason, did not come within the protection granted by the anti-injunction statute).
87 (S. Ct. 1939) 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 964 at 968.
38 The court also relied on Everett, Inc., v. Penna, I 68 Misc. 589, 6 N. Y. S.
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upon an equal basis and if an injunction can issue against an employer to restrain him from violating a collective bargaining contract, it may issue against the union from likewise doing so."
And the injunction restraining all picketing until the determination of
the arbitration was granted against the union.
Nearly all collective contracts are entered into for a specified period
of time. If the collective contract were really a "general offer" or a
"contract for the benefit of the employees as third parties beneficiaries,"
the time specified in the collective contract could have no other meaning than to indicate the period of time for which the employment was
to last. Neither of those doctrines leaves any room in the collective
contract for the rights and duties of the union itself. But the courts
nullify any attempt to establish such a concept,89 so directly at odds with
the reality. On the whole, both employee and employer feel that their
relationship is terminable at will, with the exception of the specific
restrictions imposed by the collective contract itself. Aside from that
exception, employer and union are bound as against each other for the
period of time fixed in the collective contract, with the result that for
that period wages, hours, and other conditions of employment are fixed
irrespective of the length of the individual employment term. To that
effect was the decision in Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault.40 The case
is especially significant because here the collective contract, besides
limiting its terms to two years, sought to protect employees from unjust
discharge by a provision referring such disputes to arbitration. The
court found that the company, in discharging the plaintiff upon the
(2d) 630 (1938) (motion under anti-injunction statute to dismiss complaint seeking
to restrain committee of defendant bricklayers' union from violating the terms of the
collective contract by calling a strike, denied). See also, Gilchrist Co. v. Metal Polishers,
etc., Union, (N .J. Ch. 1919) 113 A. 320 (1919) (injunction preventing the union
from calling or assisting a strike in violation of a collective contract granted). In Lundoff-Bicknell Co. v. Smith, 24 Ohio App. 294, 156 N. E. 243 (1927), there was no
evidence to show that the strike arising in violation of the clause was called by the
union or that it was even in accordance with the manner provided in the by-laws of the
union. This seems to have been the real reason for the reversal in the higher court of
an order enjoining the officers of the union from doing anything to induce the employees not to go back to work, although the reasoning is in terms of the unenforceability of personal service contracts.
89
The uniformity of decisions indicating a firm adherence to the proposition
pointed out in the text is violated only in the recent Texas case of Moore County
Carbon Co. v. Whitten, (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) 140 S. W. (2d) 880. But this case
confused the period of time for which the collective contract was to run with the term
of the individual employment relationship.
40
157 Tenn. 461, 9 S. W. (2d) 692 (1928).
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closing of the mine during the course of the collective contract, did not
at all thereby violate any of his rights. The court stated that the collective contract establishes the conditions under which labor shall be
· rendered but it by no means binds the company to operate "its mines
continuously during this time, or to continue the wages of miners during a discontinuance of operations." To like effect are Volquardsen v.
Southern Amusement Co.,41 and Amelotte v. Dold Packing Co.42 In
the former decision the court plainly stated the issue: "The plaintiff
is limited to an enforcement of his individual rights under the [ collective] contract. He cannot champion the rights of the local union as
a whole." Later on, we shall address ourselves to the question of those
"individual rights" and of their jural relation to the collective contract.
In the latter decision, the standpoint of New York courts, always, as we
saw, mindful of a clear distinction between the collective contract and
its parties on the one hand and the individual employment relationship on the other, leaves nothing to be desired. We may conclude then
that the collective contract, except for reasons expressly outlined
therein, limits neither the employee's right to quit nor the employer's
right to discharge during the life of the contract.48
But in the event of a violation of the collective contract, what of
those exceptional provisions mentioned above, which restrict the employer's freedom "to hire and to fire" workers at will? First let us
41 (La. App. 1934) I 56 So. 678 at 679. There a one-year collective contract with
a local union contained a paragraph providing two weeks' notice of intention to discharge or to quit. Plaintiff, discharged after proper notice, sued for loss of wages for
the remainder of the term of the collective contract.
42 173 Misc. 477, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 929 (1940). Plaintiff sued for the wages
he would have earned had he not been discharged before the expiration of the collective
contract. This contract restricted the employer's right to discharge workers to cases when
there was "just cause or incompetency." Plaintiff alleged that he was discharged in
consequence of a plan to sell and close out the Buffalo shop. Motion to dismiss the
action for failure to state a cause of action granted. See also Illinois Central R. R.
v. Moore, (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) IIZ F. (2d) 959 (the 30-day notice required to
discontinue the collective contract is not to be confused with the limitations imposed
by the collective contract on the right to discharge an employee). To the same effect,
Jones v. Hearst Consolidated Publications, 190 Ga. 762, IO S. E. (2d) 761 (1940).
See also Barnes v. Hall, (Ky. 1941) 146 S. W. (2d) 929 (terminaion of collective
contract does not terminate employment).
43 ln Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Webb, (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) 64 'F. (2d) 902,
relied on in the New York decision, the court in considering a collective contract
made for about twenty months, took an even broader view, if possible. It said (p.
904): "Ordinarily, as in this case, there is no period fixed for the hirings and they
are at the will of the parties. • .• But the employment though indefinite as to time
is a relationship while it lasts, and is subject to the conditions fixed in the working
agreement for the industry."
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consider those clauses which restrict the power to discharge. When the
collective contract really grants rights to, and imposes duties upon,
the contracting parties, the violation of the contract by one party must
be sufficient to entitle the other party to all legal and equitable remedies
available. Usually the collective contract provides the machinery for
the settlement of any disputes arising thereunder, often by establishing arbitration boards.'" Let us suppose that during the course of such
a contract an individual member has been discharged without any
previous investigation or resort to arbitration to determine the "cause"
thereof, in direct violation of the collective contract. Has the union a
right to specific performance of that provision against the other party
to the contract, i.e., can it force reinstatement of that employee? Here,
again, we must summarily dispose of all those untenable theories
which unrealistically ignore the standing of the unions as a party to the
contract. The union has contracted for itself at least, because of its own
interest in maintaining and increasing the number of its members with
a consequent expansion of its bargaining power.
In recent years the courts have approached the problem of collective contracts much more realistically than many writers on that subject realize. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
had occasion quite recently to pass upon a judgment confirming an
award rendered on the petition of a union against an employer for a
discharge of one member in alleged violation of the collective contract.45
In another action in which a member, relying on the collective contract,
moved to compel the employer to arbitrate their dispute, the New
York Supreme Court in denying the motion said:
"Another valid objection to this arbitration is the defective manner in which it is sought. The contract was between the union
44

A good example of such a system is to be found in Farulla v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 155 Misc. 262, 279 N. Y. S. 228 (1935), and in Rolandez v. Star Liquor
Dealers, 257 App. Div. 97, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 17 (1939). See also WrrrE, THE GovERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES 260 et seq. (1932).
45
Simon v. Stag Laundry, 259 App. Div. I06, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 197 (1940).
The Appellate Division reversed for a defect in the award irrelevant to our problem.
The Court of Appeals in President Self Service v. Affiliated Restaurateurs, 280 N. Y.
354, 21 N. E. (2d) 188 (1939), held that in the case of a discharge of a member
it is up to the union, not the member, to start the arbitration proceeding provided
for in the collective contract. The National Railroad Adjustment Board follows a
similar rule with respect to claims arising from matters dealt with in the agreements
entered into by the majority unions. See the ATTORNEY GENERAL's CoMMITTEE oN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, MoNOGRAPH No. 17, RAILWAY LABOR, p. 15 (1940).
Aside from that there is the question, currently controversial, whether the board will
entertain the claims of individuals when no collective contract is in issue. Id., p. 16.
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and the employer and the perusal of Schlesinger v. Quinto • . •
would indicate that the union and not the petitioner should have
made the application." 46
Two additional factors might be noted. First, the remedy sought
by the union is not the same in every case of a violation of the contract.
It is not every breach of a collective contract which a court of equity
will enjoin.47 Nor is the complainant limited in his relief to money
damages. In determining the right to injunctive relief, the test is not
only the adequacy of the remedy at law but also the nature of the particular right violated.
Once again, it is to be observed that the contractual right of the
union to have the employer pay wages pursuant to the contract is not
identical with the claim acquired by the individual members to payment
for the work done by them. The union acquires by the collective contract a vested right against the other party to the contract to insist
that the contracted wage scale be maintained with respect to all workers
involved.48 This interest need not mathematically correspond to the
sum of the individual interests violated in so far as they are determinable in dollars and cents. Moreover, that interest exists independently
of the interests of individual employees relying on the collective contract. 49 The employer whose workers, afraid of a discharge, do not
venture into a dispute with him, will not enjoy the profits of his violation of the contracted union scale when the union sues for performance
of the collective contract.lS0 Under these circumstances the union be46 Petition of Minasian, (S. Ct. 1939) 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 818 at 819. The other
objection raised was the inexcusable laches on the petitioner's part. It is in keeping with
industrial practice that the union demands arbitration in the case of discharges allegedly
violative of the collective contract. See Winter v. Lefkowitz, (S. Ct. 1938) 6 N. Y. S.
(2d) 185. Now, N. Y. Laws (1940), c. 851, amending N. Y. Civil Practice Act, §
1448, completely satisfied that notion. It is, therefore, inconceivable that in Illinois
Central R. R. v. Moore, (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) II2 F. (2d) 959, the union was
advised by the court to seek relief from the discharge of a member in violation of the
collective contract by adjustment or strike.
47 Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N. Y. S. 3u (1928).
48 See Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Morphy,
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 576. Here the union appealed from an order permitting the receiver to cut wages l 5 o/o.
49
In Murphy v. Ralph, 165 Misc. 335, 299 N. Y. S. 270 (1937), the unions
moved for an injunction to restrain the defendants from violating the collective contract by employing nonmembers for a longer time and for lower wages than the contract required. The injunction was granted.
ISO The laws of various foreign countries draw a distinction between judicial
disputes arising between the immediate parties to a collective contract on issues of its
interpretation or of its purview on the one hand, and "individual disputes" on the
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comes the real party in interest 51 as to each phase of the contract.
Accordingly, when the union seeks an injunction preventing the discharge of employees in violation of the collective contract, it stands in
the same position as when it seeks to maintain the contracted wage
scale. 52 Moreover, where the employer pursuant to the contract is
obliged to employ only union members, but his freedom to discharge
anyone is limited only by that check on his choice for the successor, it
is very doubtful in the usual employment relationship whether the
individual employee may claim a violation of his personal rights. 58
Nor can an individual union member assert the provision often included in a collective contract compelling discharge of nonmembers
who have failed to avail themselves of membership within a certain
prescribed period. One sees therefore that the obligations created by
the collective contract are not the individual property and individual
burden of each union member. No matter how we distinguish between
other. The latter class of disputes are those which arise between one or more of the
individual employees and the employer concerning the everyday conditions of employment. Such is the case in the Italian law. The "magistratura del lavoro," a special
department of the appellate courts, has jurisdiction over the first class of disputes; the
courts of general, original jurisdiction over the second. See Italian Royal Decree, February 26, 1928, no. 471, [1928] 2 LEGGI E DECRETI DEL REGNO n'lTALIA, as amended
by Royal Decree May 21, 1934, no. 1073, [1934] id. 1021, on the procedure
in individual labor disputes and the Law of April 3, 1926, No. 563, [ 1926] 2 id. 527,
on collective agreements. The "associazione," however, has the right to intervene in
these "individual disputes" when the action rests upon a violation of a provision of the
collective contract. See art. 7 of the aforementioned Royal Decree of I 934, on the
procedure in individual labor disputes.
51 Moreschi v. Mosteller, (D. C. Pa. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 613 {the court did not
dispose of the case on its merits, finding that by Pennsylvania statute a labor dispute
does not fall within the jurisdiction of the courts until all other methods of settling
it have been exhausted).
52 Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N. Y. S. 311 (1928).
58 In O'Keefe v. Local 463, United Assn. of Plumbers, 277 N. Y. 300, 14 N. E.
(2d) 77 (1938), an action brought by some of the members of the defendant union
to compel their re-employment was dismissed on the ground that their discharge was
within the contract since it had been recommended by a joint arbitration board set up
by the contract. In Harper v. Local Union No. 520, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 48 S. W.
(2d) 1033, pleadings and judgment shed some light upon this question by contrasting the "particular" member, "severally," and his flimsy chances of becoming employed,
with the rights of "all the members," viz., the union, as plaintiff. Since the collective
contract was being continually breached in the same manner {by discharging members
and employing nonmembers), the union was deemed to be interested in judicial
protection from this otherwise remediless wrong. In Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co.,
162 Misc. 177, 292 N. Y. S. 898 (1936), the union invoking the provision precluding lockouts during the life of the contract obtained a decree directing the company to put all locked-out members back to work.
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the rights and duties of the individual on the one hand and those of
the aggregate of individuals on the other,54 we can perceive no determinable relationship between them as we can in the familiar concept of joint, or joint and several, rights and obligations. 55 And with
regard to contract obligations the individual member is not at all able
to perform those relating, for example, to the settlement of labor disputes or to the maintenance of industrial peace. 56 Duties of the employer owed to the union, on the other hand, are in no way regarded
as choses in action belonging to those who were members when the
contract was made. When the common law recognized the collective
contract, it could not help treating the union as such as promisee, distinguishable from its members, and to that extent an entity.

B. Effect of Change of Me_mbership
An examination of the precedents discussed on the foregoing pages
indicates a need for further classification. A distinction must be drawn
between a contract entered into between an employer and a number of
his employees 57 regarding their working conditions,58 and a genuine
collective contract. The latter may be limited in scope to a certain plant
54 These are the "rights of the union as a whole," contrasted in Volquardsen v.
Southern Amusement Co., (La. App. 1934) 156 So. 678, with "individual rights."
55 The notion of considering rights and duties created by the collective contract
as different from those created by each particular employment contract, but yet as the
joint and several obligations of the members performable through the union's officers
as their agent, is voiced in Christiansen v. Local 680, Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees, 126 N. J. Eq. 508, 10 A. (2d) 168 (1940).
56 The National Labor Relations Board also used the "joint property'' theory as
the peg on which to hang the "substitutionary doctrine," relying upon Cassetana v.
Filling Station Operators Union, (Cal. Super. Ct. 1937) l L. R. R. 516. See e. g.,
Matter of M. & M. Woodworking Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 372 at 381 (1938). It is indicative of the weakness of this device that the courts, in repudiating that doctrine,
completely ignored the "joint property" notion.
57 See Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Red Star Shoe Repairing Co., (Pa.
Ct. Com. PI. 1937) l C. C.H. LABOR CASES, 1f 18,066 (1940).
58 A good example of that distinction can be seen in Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y.
207, 76 N. E. 5 (1905). There, the contract provided, first, for the employment of
union members for one year, second, for certain wages specified and, "generally," for
the regulation of the employment relationship. A special provision forbade the employment of nonmembers. Indeed, this contract was both an employment contract and
a collective contract. As a matter of course the document was signed by both the employees and the union. The court accordingly called it a tripartite contract. In Ahlquist
v. Alaska-Portland Packers> Assn., (C. C. A. 9th, 1930) 39 F. (2d) 349, the "articles"
in issue were likewise signed by each one of the plaintiffs. From that fact, one can
see why the "custom" of the company in dealing with other seamen was found not
binding upon the libellants.
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or to one company, but never to individually designated employees. It
does not grant rights to, or extract obligations from, the individual
employee. The criterion by which its scope is determined is membership,
or unit. The membership of a group considered as a unit is changeable and therefore the individual is of no legal significance in the contractual relationship of the group as such. The former type, however,
represents no more than an aggregate of individual employment contracts granting rights and imposing duties only on the individuals
whom it concerns. It is at the discretion of the individual employee
whether these rights are to be enforced or wholly waived.
Let us examine some more actual situations arising in cases of recent
years with an eye toward gleaning therefrom the basic doctrines underlying the collective contract. If the union, as a party to the collective
contract, is given contractual rights and not the individual members, no
matter what their number, the shifting of the majority of those members to another union cannot substitute the latter union for the former
one in the collective contract. A statute, such as the National Labor
Relations Act, may provide that such a change in affiliation shall a:ffect
the efficacy of the collective contract,59 depending perhaps on whether
that contract had been entered into after the inception of a representation dispute 60 or on whether it had become outmoded because of its
59 See 49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 151 et seq. In its
more recent decrees the National Labor Relations Board has suggested the time element as the paramount factor in the certification of a new representative. When the
existing collective contract has but a short time to run, for example less than one year,
the board holds that the contracting union is to remain the representative of the employees until the expiration of the contract. E.g., Matter of Superior Electrical Products Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 19 at 22 (1938); Matter of National Sugar Refining Co.,
10 N. L. R. B. 1410 (1939); Matter of Levis Bolt & Nut Co., 23 N. L. R. B.,
No. 68 (1940). See also 38 CoL. L. REv. 1243 at 1249 (1938). Very recently, in
Matter of Taylor Milling Corp., 26 N. L. R. B., No. 40 (1940), the board found,
although the majority had shifted its allegiance to another organization, that the employer was not prevented thereby from availing himself of a closed-shop provision made
with the former organization only a few months before. Thus, the board now denies
,•alidity to the "substitutionary doctrine," although it had previously pledged itself to
it by adopting it from the National Mediation Board, which voiced it in its first annual
report, p. 23 et seq. See Matter of New England Transport Co., I N. L. R. B. 130 at
139 ( I 936). The above cases indicate that the qualification of time arose only later. The
problem will not come up, of course, when the contracting parties insert a clause providing for an earlier termination in case another union is certified by the board. For
further details and suggestions, see Rice, "The Legal Significance of Labor Contracts
under the National Labor Relations Act," 37 M1cH. L. REv, 693 at 720 (1939),
and comment, 38 MICH. L. REV. 516 (1940).
60 Matter of Wilmington Transport Co., 4 N. L. R. B. 750 (1937); Matter of
Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 18 N. L. R. B., No. 54 (1938). See Rice article, cited
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unreasonably long duration. 61 But even then the newly selected representative of the majority could in no way be entitled to the exercise of
those rights which were granted in a; contract to which it was neither
party nor legal successor.62 The question arises most often 68 when
there is a closed-shop clause or a provision granting preference to the
members of the contracting union in the collective contract. Such clauses
are sometimes found to be against public policy and therefore illegal
because, for instance, the union favored therein has not been selected
by the free choice of the majority of the employees, or has obtained
the position as the result of company favoritism or some other unfair
practice. 6 ' In that case it is up to the legitimate representative, with or
supra, note 59. This does not refer to the "members-only'' contracts because they
certainly cannot be held to bar the certification of the representative of the unit and
the fulfillment of the employer's duty to bargain with this representative. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197 at 237, 59
S. Ct. 206 (1938). See also Eastwood-Nealley Corp. v. International Assn. of Machinists, 124 N. J. Eq. 274, I A. (2d) 477 (1938), and see Rice article at p. 709.
61 Matter of Hubinger Co., 4 N. L. R. B. 428 (1937); Matter of MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, 7 N. L. R. B. 662 (1938); Matter of Columbia Broadcasting
System, 8 N. L. R. B. 508 (1938).
62 The courts are also faced with such a situation when the parent organization,
in creating a new local, revokes the charter of the local which was party to the contract. See Klinger v. J. S. Krum, Inc., 259 App. Div. 309, 19 N. Y. S. {2d) 193
(1940) {the court rightfully rejected an attempt to substitute the new local for the
old, and to force the employer into arbitration provided for in that contract). The
relationship between local and national labor bodies is not analogous to the relationship
between national and local church organizations to which the doctrine of the "implied
trust" has been so aptly applied. In the latter case, the intention of the donor must
be read in the light of the doctrines of the national religious body. See Gibson v.
Trustees of Pencader Presbyterian Church, (Del. Ch. 1939) IO A. (2d) 332. The
local union, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with purely local matters. But
see the note in 53 HARV. L. REv. II99 (1940).
63 The question of the identity of the union has also come up in connection with
the refusal of an employer to bargain collectively with a union because it has meanwhile changed name and affiliation. The court rejected that defense and enforced the
board order in Continental Oil Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 10th,
1940) II3 F. {2d) 473•
M If each and every employee were to be considered as acquiring contractual
rights from the collective contract, it would be strange indeed that the board frowns
npon these provisions. For in that case, the persons who compose the majority would
be the same ones that would be disqualified by the board as. not entitled to any contractual rights. The consistent policy of the National Labor Relations Board, to the
effect that an organization consisting of nearly all employees cannot claim rights under
a closed-shop agreement if it has been dominated by the employer, can be seen from
many decrees. See, for example, Matter of California Walnut Growers' Assn., 1 8
N. L. R. B., No. 69 (1939); Matter of Virginia Electric & Power Co., 20 N. L. R. B.,
No. 87 (1940). Furthermore, the courts approve this board policy. See Jefferson Electric Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 949;
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without a preliminary order of the labor board, to do its best to establish itself in the same, but now unassailable, position formerly held
by the pseudo-representative. Never, however, could the old illegal
agreement be a legal basis for any claim of the new representative. But
in the case of an otherwise legal contract, where the only change had
been a shift of the majority, the National Labor Relations Board employed the substitutionary doctrine, i.e., it recognized the new union in
place of the old without any legal assignment or succession.
The majority of the members of a union may exercise their power
to decide, an incident of every majority of an organized group. But
as soon as they secede from the former affiliation and henceforth act
only as individuals, no matter how great in number was their secession
from the union, they are deprived of all that power that they formerly
possessed in their capacity as the decisive group within the union. Their
situation with respect to the collective contract of that union by no
means differs from that with respect to the funds, the office leases, the
furniture, regalia, and other physical property constituting the outfit
of a labor organization. There is full harmony among the authorities
that seceding members, even though in the majority and even though
they adopt for the new organization constituted by them the same
name as the old one, are not allowed to carry away on their backs the
property of the old union. 65
It was, therefore, entirely by that reasoning that the courts, when
they came to pass upon the analogous question with respect to the collective contract, answered it similarly. Reversing the National Labor
Relations Board, the court found in M & M Wood Working ComDomanick v. Triboro Coach Corp., (S. Ct. 1940) 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 650, modified 173
Misc. 9u, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 960 (1940), reversed 259 App. Div. 657, 20 N. Y. S.
(2d) 306 (1940); National Labor Relations Board v. J. Greenbaum Tanning Co., (C.
C. A. 7th, 1940) IIO F. (2d) 984. But, whereas this holding of the courts is completely in line with their denial of the "substitutionary" doctrine, this is not the case
with the National Labor Relations Board. Its recently restricted acceptance of that
doctrine (see notes 56 and 59, supra) is inconsistent with its practice of dealing with
the organization as a contracting party to closed-shop agreements.
65
Altman v. Benz, 27 N. J. Eq. 331 (1876); Ahlendorf v. Barkous, 20 Ind. App.
656, 50 N. E. 887 (1898); McFadden v. Murphy, 149 Mass. 341, 21 N. E. 868
(1889); Shipwrights', Joiners' and Calkers' Assn., Local No. 2 v. Mitchell, 60 Wash.
529, I I I P. 780 (1910); Brownfield v. Simon, 94 Misc. 720, 158 N. Y. S. 187
(1916), affd. 174 App. Div. 872, 159 N. Y. S. 1102 (1916), affd. 225 N. Y. 643,
121 N. E. 858 (1918), and quite recently Steinmiller v. McKean, (S. Ct. 1940) 21
N. Y. S. (2d) 621. All of the above cases deal with these questions with respect to
the union's property. See also Kelso v. Cavanagh, 137 Misc. 653, 244 N. Y. S. 90
(1930), note 73, infra.
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pany v. National Labor Relations Board 66 that the company was not
guilty of any discrimination against the members of any local to which
the majority of its employees had shifted their allegiance, when it
continued to comply with the closed-shop provision of the collective
contract entered into with the former union, and thus exclusively hired
its members. The Supreme Court of the United States, faced with a
similar question in National Labor Relations Board v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., 61 did not deal with the matter, although the court
below had raised it. The Supreme Court found that the employment
relationship of the members of a steamship crew who had shifted their
allegiance continued even though they had received payment and had
signed off the articles after their arrival at their destination. The question whether the Waterman Company in hiring anew is to be deemed
bound by the preferential clause of the old agreement remains to be
answered in the future. Furthermore, in Peninsular & Occidental S.S.
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board 68 a federal circuit court of appeals vacated an order of the board, which again had declined to give
effect to such a clause of a collective contract on the ground that the
majority of the crew seceding from the union which was the party to
that contract had joined another union which, at the time when that
contract was made, did not even exist. In this case also there was no
legal reason why the employment relationship should not have been
held terminable upon the return of the ship to the port. Actually, the
crew had been discharged at the end of the voyage after a makeshift

66 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 101 F. (2d) 938. The facts indicated that the condition under which the affiliation of the local union with the national organization might
be withdrawn had not been complied with. The act of swearing to a new allegiance
by the majority of the members and by the officers of the local failed, therefore, to
identify their organization with the old local. Thus, the old local remained the party
to the contract and in affiliation with its old parent organization, despite the election
of new officers and the secession of most of its members.
67 309 U. $. 206, 60 S. Ct. 493 (1940). The court reversed the circuit court
of appeals, Waterman S. S. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 5th,
(1939), 103 F. (2d) 157, which had held against the board that the company was
bound under its collective contract with the International Seamen's Union (affiliated
with the American Federation of Labor) to select new crews for "The Bienville" and
"The Fairland" from I. S. U.'s members, because the tenure of employment of the
old crews who had changed their membership to the National Maritime Union (affiliated with the Committee for Industrial Organization) had come to an end when
they received their wages and signed off.

68 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 411, cert. denied, 305 U. S. 653, 59 S.
Ct. 248 (1939).
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settlement of their sit-down strike 69 had been reached preceding the
last voyage. But aside from the justification of their discharge, in this
case the clause of the collective contract could never have been of any
avail to the new union, as can be seen from situations analogous to
that in the Waterman case. There again the Supreme Court found the
wholesale discharge of the crew, now affiliated with another national
organization, to be of weight in determining the question whether this
in itself did not amount to a discrimination on account of their union
activities. 10
In a case where one employee has, for instance, voluntarily left his
employment or in any other fashion a vacancy has been created not
traceable to any unfair labor practice, there would not be any reason
why the company could not replace that employee from the members
of the former union, so long, at least, as the National Labor Relations
Board did not forbid it to do so.n And again, when not the majority
of the union members but, say, only the employees of a plant with
which the union has collectively contracted, shift their allegiance to
another union, the result could not be different. In a Pennsylvania
case 72 the court, faced with such a situation, pointed to the fact that the
69 The details may be omitted, particularly the statements regarding threats of
sabotage by the crew. See National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 59 S. Ct. 490 (1939), on the problem of limitations on statutory protection of the tenure of employment.
70 This reference to the mass discharge of men whose employment would customarily have been continued is really the basis of the entire reasoning. Such a discharge might be found to constitute an unfair labor practice. It is, therefore, in view
of the policy of the National Labor Relations Act, immaterial whether the various
employment relationships had been terminated at the end of the voyage or whether
they had been entered into for no specified time and had been terminable at will.
71 It is not for the National Labor Relations Board to pass judgment on private
rights, nor is it the board's function to put an end to a collective contract. See National
Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U.S. 350, 60 S. Ct. 569 (1940).
All this suggests the problem of how a board decree ordering the employer to cease
complying with certain provisions of a collective contract affects his obligations under
the contract. No case on that point has been found so far. The general proposition
voiced in 2 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 458 (1932), suggests the pertinent law in
such a situation.
72 In Pennsylvania Labor Board v. Red Star Shoe Repairing Co., (Pa. Ct. Com.
Pl. 1937) I C. C. H. LABOR CASES, 1f 18,066 (1940), prior to the expiration of a
closed-shop agreement entered into with their local union, eight employees shifted
to another local of a different affiliation. The board found the company which had
discharged the employees at the request of the former local guilty of an unfair practice.
The court reversed. In Matter of Mason Mfg. Co., 15 N. L. R. B. 295 (1939), the
board no longer placed weight on the f~ct that all the employees had shifted their
afliliation from the A. F. L. union to a C. I. 0. local. See also, note 59, supra.
Is all this to imply a weakening of the "substitutionary'' doctrine by the board, eventually leading to its complete abandonment?
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collective contract did not run to the individual employees alone, but
to all the members of the union. A collective agreement is, so the court
explained, a contract between the employer and a group consisting of
all members of the union, regardless whether they are all employed
by the other contracting party. It is apparent that the gist of the court's
reasoning coincides with the proposition that the employment relationship does not alone make the employee a direct beneficiary of the collective contract, but that the rights and duties created by the latter
exclusively concern the contracting parties, the employer and the group
as such.
This rationale shows also that the problems of the collective contract which arise from a revocation of the charter of the local union
by the parent body or from its dissolution, are so far not difficult of
solution. When the union, for example a local, which was the party to
the contract has legally severed itself from the parent body, its iden. ity is not affected thereby. The local, if it was the party which entered
into the contract, remains that party. 73 In the M & M case not even
such a severance had taken place. Its facts, however, illustrate another
aspect of the situation, i.e., when the parent body was a party or a
co-party to the contract. In that case the secession of the local cannot
deprive that parent organization of the rights it acquired under the
contract. A new collective contract entered into between the employer
and the union to which the employees have now shifted their allegiance
may retain the provisions of the old contract provided that the former
union has ceased to function. Such was the case in Brisbin v. E. L.
Oliver Lodge No. 335.14, All the more does this hold true when a new
73 Labonite v. Cannery Workers' and Farm Laborers' Union, 197 Wash. 543,
86 P. (2d) 189 (1938) (this union, despite its secession, was held bound by the collective contract to the employers, as well as to the holders of permits issued to nonmembers); World Trading Corp. v. Kolchin, 166 Misc. 854, 2 N. Y. _S. (2d) 195
(1938) (efficacy of the collective contract, especially of the arbitration provision upheld
against the employer, despite the fact that the contracting union had transferred its
affiliation to another organization and had changed its name). On this matter the
courts and the National Labor Relations Board are in full accord. See Matter of American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., etc., IO N. L. R. B. 1355 (1939) (union, formerly
party to the contract and certified as representative, changed its allegiance from the
A. F. L. to the C. I. O.; company's objection with regard to its identity rejected).
This view can also be seen in Kelso v. Cavanagh, 137 Misc. 653, 244 N. Y. S. 90
(1930) (refusal of banks to recognize checks made up by the local upon the ground
of the revocation of its charter by the district council of the parent organization held
unlawful).
74
134 Neb. 517, 279 N. W. 277 (1938). The decisive factor here was the fact
that the new union, along with the employer, continued to enforce the so-called "Married Women's Agreement" entered into by the old union, of which the plaintiff was
a member.
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union has been assigned the rights of the former union and it assumes
the obligations arising out of the contract. This is accomplished by a
novation, which completely substitutes the new union in place of the
old. 75 There might arise borderline situations such as the secession of
all, or nearly all, members from the old to a new local union with or
without a dissolution of the former organization which had entered
into the original agreement. Now, when the new union as well as the
employer abide by that old agreement, little consideration will be given
to the former union if it suddenly starts stressing its contractual rights.
We might, in order to deny the old union's rights, have recourse to
the doctrine of laches. But is not the withdrawal of all its members and
its consequent inability to accomplish the objectives inherent in a collective contract tantamount to the unanimous vote required for dissolution? 76 The conclusion reached rests again upon the concept of a new
collective agreement 77 adopting the terms of the old one and not upon
the concept of the conveyance of their property rights from the members who shifted their allegiance to the new union.

II
RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES DERIVED FROM
COLLECTIVE CONTRACTS

We have seen that it is the union whose function it is to enforce
compliance by the employer with the closed-shop provisions, wage
75 Irwin v. Foley, 259 App. Div. 156, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 185 (1940). The facts
in this case were similar, i.e., there were contractual relationships, not collective, and
there was no problem of the succession of one union to the rights and obligations of
another. The corresponding situation with regard to employers arises where there is a
change in the ownership of the plant which was involved in a collective contract. See,
for example, Basson v. Edjoimac Amusement Corp., 259 App. Div. 1005, 20 N. Y. S.
(2d) 924 (1940) (successor in ownership held bound to the standards established by
the collective contract upon the ground that he availed himself thereof).
76
This may depend primarily on the pertinent provisions of the by-laws and constitution. See, e.g., Minor v. St. John's Union Grand Lodge, (Tex. Civ. App. 1910)
130 S. W. 893. By examining the nature of the interest of the members of an unincorporated association in the group funds after dissolution, we may find the reason
for the distinction in the result, when, on the one hand, the members secede into a new
union, and on the other, when the union is dissolved or suspended. For a thorough
discussion on the control claimed by the parent body over the assets of a dissolved or
suspended local, see the enlightening article of Jaffe, "Inter-Union Disputes in Search
of a Forum," 49 YALE L. J. 424 at 446 (1940).
11
See Brisbin v. E. L. Oliver Lodge No. 335, 134 Neb. 517, 279 N. W. 277
(1938), and the facts in Matter of David Karron, Inc., 26 N. L. R. B., No. 63
(1940) (with consent of employer, succession of new union to which all employees
had shifted their allegiance recognized).
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provisions, provisions demanding notice of discharge, 78 provisions restricting the use of business secrets by a discharged employee, and the
like. 79 We have seen also that it is not the individual employee but
again the union which sets in motion the machinery provided for in the
collective contract for the arbitration of disputes and the redress of
wrongs. There is no room in the obligations created by that contract
for a distinction between "collective" and "individual" rights and
duties. 80 Nor, by the same token, can a distinction be made between
matters affecting all employees and those affecting each individual
employee. 81 All obligations originating in that contract are collective
and general because a group is one of the contracting parties. One must
not, however, confuse the questions concerning the parties to, and the
terms of, the collective contract with those of its bearing upon the
individual employee in his relationship to the employer. The right of
the union to compel the employer to abide by a certain wage schedule
does not coincide with the right of an individual employee to enforce
payment of his wages for a certain period of time in pursuance of that
schedule. There is not only diversity of parties in the proceedings;
there is also a difference in the cause of action and in the relief sought
by them. The union's action rests upon a breach of the collective contract and seeks the specific performance thereof or perhaps a declaratory
judgment. A variety of actions and forms of relief lie open to the
employee, however. Let us examine this proposition by again referring
to the cases. These will demonstrate at once the varying effect of the
collective contract upon the employment relationship.
78 See, e.g., § 14 of the Commercial Printing Contract or § III of the Goodrich
Rubber Agreement in N. L. R. B. DIVISION OF EcoNOMic RESEARCH BuLL. No. 4,
WRITTEN TRADE AGREEMENTS IN CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING 275, 310 (1939). This
valuable book also illustrates the variety of terms possible in collective contracts.
79 See, e.g., the terms in the collective contract involved in Whiting Milk Companies v. O'Connell, 277 Mass. 570, 179 N. E. 169 (1931); Whiting Milk Comr
panies v. Grondin, 282- Mass. 41, 184 N. E. 379 (1933); East Chester Cleaners v.
Platek, (S. Ct. 1936) 95 N. Y. L. J. 2438.
so Thus, in Volquardsen v. Southern Amusement Co., (La. App. 1934) 156 So.
678, the employees, suing on the collective contract for damages resulting from a premature discharge, lost the case. See the text referring to note 41, supra. The period of
time for which the collective contract was made was held to concern only the union,
as the party to the contract, but not the individual member who, the court went on
to say, may "enforce his individual rights under the contract." But are not the last three
words contradictory to the ratio decidendi?
81 This distinction is drawn in Christiansen v. Local 680, Milk Drivers & Dairy
Employees, 126 N. J. Eq. 508, IO A. (2d) 168 (1940). The union, counterclaiming
for performance of the local contract, in violation of which four members had been
discharged, was found not to have stated a cause of action because such a discharge does
not affect the members collectively. Cf. the Louisiana decision in note So, supra.
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A. Where Individual Employment Contract Embodies
Standards Established by Collective Agreement
The first group are those cases in which the schedules of the collective agreement constitute the terms of the individual employment
contract by express or implied incorporation. It is clear" that in such a
case the question of the membership of the employee in the union becomes entirely irrelevant, since those schedules become binding upon
employer and employee alike because of their explicit adoption in the
individual employment contract. 82 By that agreement only do they become one of the terms of employment. 83 Then, it will involve an interpretation of such employment agreement to determine whether a
subsequent change of those schedules affects it. 84 In Rhea Mfg. Co.
v. Industrial Commission 85 the court of last resort, reversing the judgment rendered by the circuit court, held (with one judge dissenting)
that the subsequent concerted action of the union had no effect upon
82 See Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S. W. 459 (1920). A nonmember
entering the service was referred by the employer to the terms of the collective contract.
In Moody v. Model Window Glass Co., 145 Ark. 197, 224 S. W. 436 (1920), the
court found that that type of individual contracting by reference to the collective terms
might outlast the period of the collective contract. In Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Webb,
(C. C. A. 5th, 1933) 64 F. (2d) 902, and in Yazoo & M. V. Ry. v. Sideboard, 161
Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931), the company was also held to be bound by the wage
schedules as to nonmembers because of the reliance of the parties on the rates of pay
paid indiscriminately to both members and nonmembers. The dismissal of the actions
was based, however, on the acceptance of substandard wages by the plaintiffs over a
relatively long period of time. As to a member, such an "accord" could hardly be said
to be a defense.
83 This point of view is stressed in Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn.
461, 9 S. W. (2d) 692 (1928), and in Caven v. Canadian Pacific Ry., (Alberta
S. Ct.) [1924] 3 Dom. L. R. 783, reversed by the appellate division, [1925] 1 Dom.
L. R. 122, second decision affirmed by Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
[1925] 3 Dom. L. R. 841. In Matter of Superior Tanning Co., 14 N. L. R. B. 942
(1939), the individual contracts made reference to "the highest wages that may be
generally paid by other employers of the same trade." See also True v. Amalgamated
Collieries, [ I 940] A. C. 5 37 (period of limitation applicable to individual contracts
held to apply).
84 Elegant v. Bookbinder, 173 Misc. 313, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 173 (1940), deals
with the problem of the statutory incorporation of a section of another statute, and
comes to the conclusion that such an incorporation also embraces all future changes
which might occur in the incorporated section. But the situation where a legislative act
is incorporated may differ materially from the case where a "transaction" is the thing
incorporated, particularly if we are to give weight to the actual intention of the parties.
This holds true even of compacts between states which refer to statutory provisions
enacted in one of them. See Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission v. Colburn,
310 U.S. 419, 60 S. Ct. 1039 (1940).
85 231 Wis. 643, 285 N. W. 749 (1939), discussed in 1940 Wis. L. REV. 300.

II36

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

the rights of a nonmember although the terms of his employment had
been determined by the collective contract. In that case, however, there
was involved a failure to renew rather than a change in the collective
contract. 86 A slight variation in the factual situation, therefore, might
have led the court to another result. The intention of the parties as
manifested by the adoption of that schedule may be decisive in these
situations, particularly when those provisions were adopted regardless
of the type of work or membership. 81

B. Under Statutory Provisions
There is another class of individual employee relationships controlled by the terms of the collective agreement, irrespective of the
membership of those employees in that union which is the party to the
contract. In view of the number of essays 88 already treating the many
problems raised by the Railway Labor Act,89 the National Labor
Relations Act 00 and the state statutes 91 patterned after it upon which
this kind of collective contract is based, only a few matters are worthy
of further comment. In the first place the question of the status of
these so-called statutory contracts 92 awaits solution. The statutes which
set up standards of working conditions for the whole unit, correspond86 The company had discontinued manufacturing and had laid off temporary
workers (like the plaintiff), because of the union's insistence on an increase in the wage
scale as a condition for the renewal of the collective contract. Therefore, the question
of the liability of the company for unemployment benefits arose.
87 See, e.g., Taylor v. Mathues, 112 Pa. Super. 169, 170 A. 309 (1934).
88 Some of the best articles relating to the problems mentioned in the text are
Magruder, "A Half Century of Legal Influence upon the Development of Collective
Bargaining," 50 HARV. L. REv. 1071 (1937), dealing with the majority principle,
and Rice, "The Significance of Labor Contracts under the National Labor Relations
Act," 37 M1cH, L. REv. 693 (1939), explaining the _problems involved when individual employment contracts precede the statutory contract in point of ime, a problem also extensively discussed by Ward, "The Mechanics of Collective B:irgaining,"
53 HARV. L. REv. 754 (1940). Professor Rice's article further treats with the question
of an employer's contracting outside of the schedules collectively agreed upon, with
"members-only" contracts and with the influence of a change of representation on
statutory contracts.
89
48 Stat. L. u85 (1934), 45 U.S. C. (1934), § 152 et seq., especially§ 2
(4) and (9).
90
49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 151 et seq.
91 See the list of state statutes in the painstaking study of Smith and De Lancey,
"The State Legislatures and Unionism," 38 M1cH. L. REv. 987 at 996, note 30
(1940).
.
92
Contracts made by the representative of an employee unit exercising the exclusive bargaining right conferred by statute. See Rice, "The Significance of Labor
Contracts under the National Labor Relations Act," 37 M1cH. L. REv. 693 at 695
(1939).
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ing to those collectively agreed upon between employer and majority
union, do not even require that any employee be a member of this
chosen representative of the unit. 93 It is not the collective contract which
subjects the individual employment relationships in the unit to its contents. 94 Aside from the constitutional impossibility of so delegating legislative power to private corporations, associations, and persons, the
fact also remains that only the schedules relating to employment conditions 95 are imposed upon all employees as terms of their employment in the unit, and not the other contents of the collective contract,
such as a clause providing for arbitration or one setting up an employment agency.
Instead of drawing up those schedules themselves or of delegating
the power to regulate them to administrative agencies, the recent labor
acts resorted to the method of incorporating the terms of employment
as fixed by collective contracts of the described type. Accordingly, it is
the statute which regulates and rules the employment relationships in
the unit. 96 This statutory rule remains constant although the schedules
93

See Matter of Pueblo Gas & Fuel Co., 23 N. L. R. B., No. I l l (1940) (company sought to justify its refusal to recognize the local I. B. E. W. as the bargaining
agency, on the ground that its members were ineligible to belong to the union of
electrical workers). See also the very recent case of Continental Oil Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 10th, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 473.
94
One must not confuse the reference statutes often make to sources which are of
a nonlegislative character (in some cases even wholly incorporating them) with the
sources themselves. A good illustration of a statutory incorporation of customs may be
found in the Public Contracts Act of 1936, 49 Stat. L. 2036 (1936), 41 U. S. C.
(Supp. 1939), § 35 et seq., wherein weight is placed upon the "prevailing" minimum
wages, a type of wage regulation now generally accepted throughout the country.
54 HARV. L. REv, 497 (1941), 34 CoL. L. REv. 733 (1934). The Federal Mining
Law of 1872, § 2, 17 Stat. L. 91, 30 U.S. C. (1934), § 23, offers another example
of incorporating "customs." The limits of such incorporation involve constitutional
interpretation. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 at 311, 56 S. Ct.
855 ( I 93 5). Those limits are probably worked out on the basis of the closeness of
the relationship between the persons subjected to the regulations and the sources drawn
upon. To see how statutory contracts meet with that requisite, cf. Senator Walsh's statement on the fairness of the majority principle established for the unit. 79 CoNG,
REC. 7672 (1935).
95
See text of the statutes: "in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment." 49 Stat. L. 449 at 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C.
(Supp. 1939), § 159 (a); Mass. Laws Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1939), c. 150A, § 5
(a); Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1940), § 4254-36 (a); N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940), Labor Law, § 705 (1); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1940), tit.
43, § 211.7 (a); Utah Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1939), § 49-1-10 (a); Wis. Stat. (1939),
§§ 111.02 (5), 111.05 (1).
95
Statutes directing that the schedules of the collective agreement are to apply
to nonmembers have been construed in Young v. Canadian Northern Railway, (Man.
K. B.) [1929] 4 DoM. L. REv. 452 (dictum), affd. by Judicial Committee Privy
Council, [ 1931] A. C. 83, as creating a "statutory privity'' of contract running to that
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are flexible, varying with the collective contracts establishing them.
By the act of accepting employment, each employee is charged with
knowledge of the statute affecting that employment,97 so that he cannot raise the "due process" objection that his right to contract has been
restricted. 98
Where then, if at all, 99 does individual contracting fit into the picture? There is no Supreme Court decision squarely in point at this time.
But the nearest approach to the problem may be found in the opinion
of the court in National Licorice Co. 'V. National Labor Relations
Board. 100 The case concerned very questionable individual contracts
plainly violative of the public policy represented by the statute. The
labor board had ordered the company to post notice that those individual contracts were "void and of no effect," and had been upheld by
the circuit court of appeals. The Supreme Court ( with two dissenters)
modified this order by omitting the quoted words and leaving the employees free to assert their legal rights acquired under such contracts.
True, up to that point no collective contract had been made with the
majority union, but neither had it been in the Virginian Railway case,101
on which the Court relied. There, likewise, the contract made with the
nonmember. Once again, a court reached a fictitious and hence unsatisfactory result
by attempting to read a statutory command in terms of established contractual concepts.
Now the Privy Council in True v. Amalgamated Collieries, [1940] A. C. 537, takes
the same view as presented in the text.
97
It is sufficient to quote from Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398 at 435, 54 S. Ct. 231 (1934): "existing laws [are] read into contracts in
order to fix obligations as between the parties. . .•"
98
See for these objections, Ward, "The Mechanics of Collective Bargaining,"
53 HARV. L. REV. 754 (1940). But see also note in 1940 Wis. L. REv. 300.
99
For the result of the violation of the collectively contracted schedules by the
employer, see on the one hand McNeill v. Hacker, (N. Y. City Ct. 1940) 21 N. Y. S.
(2d) 432 (individual contracts entered into subsequent to a collective agreement, held
illegal as providing for a different and lower scale of wages). See, on the other hand,
Huston v. Washington Wood & Coal Co., 4 Wash. (2d) 449, 103 P. (2d) 1095
(1940) (individual agreement entered into prior to plaintiff's becoming union member,
upheld). Contra: Illinois Central R.R. v. Moore, (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) 112 F. (2d)
959, overlooking, in its reference to Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry., 198 Ky. 477, 248
S. W. 1042 (1923), the subsequent legislative changes in railroad labor laws.
100
309 U. S. 350, 60 S. Ct. 569 (1940), involving individual contracts which
included a provision patterned after the Balleisen formula, whereby the employee
promised not to demand a closed-shop agreement or a signed collective contract. For
this model, see National Labor Relations Board v. American Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 2d,
1939) 106 F. (2d) 61, and National Labor Relations Board v. Hopwood Retinning
Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 97 at 100.
101
Virginia Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 5 I 5, 57 S. Ct. 592
(1937).
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company-ridden employees' association was held not to discharge the
company from its public duty to bargain collectively with the majority
union as representative of the unit. The Court, as one can see from that,
fully recognized the overthrow of earlier individual contracts or of a
questionable collective contract by the statutory contract contemplated
by the court. Why then the anxiety of the Court to have written down
in the notice which the company had been ordered to post, that the
order was "without prejudice to the assertion by the employees of any
legal rights they may have acquired under such [individual] contracts"? The answer is not to be found in the failure of the board to
make the holders of those contracts parties to its proceeding. If that
were the answer, why then did the Court not merely eliminate the
phrase "void and of no effect"? Although indicating reluctance to consider the "nature and extent" of the individual rights, the Court nevertheless did not question the validity of any provision of the individual
contracts except those "the effect of which would be to infringe the
rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act." 102
The statute seeks to equalize the bargaining power of employer
and employees.103 Accordingly the Supreme Court expressly denies
validity to those contractual provisions which benefit the employer
only. But there is not the slightest reason under the policy of the statute
why rights benefiting the employee only should be invalidated. By
saving the beneficial provisions of the individual contracts, the Court
reached a socially as well as a legally sound result. Not only those provisions of the employment contract extending decided financial benefits to the employee are to be saved. Provisions in individual employment contracts regarding preferences in employment, promotions, and
life insurance continue to be of great importance, irrespective of any
subsequent collective agreement. The reasoning by which the court
apparently reached its decision in the Licorice case is not uncommon.
In the New York Insurance Law,104 for example, it is provided that
any policy issued in violation of its provisions is to be binding upon
the insurer at the option of the insured, who can read those terms
required by the statute into the policy, and thus enforce it. According
to the opinion in the Licorice case, that is precisely the option offered to
employees with regard to individual employment contracts made in
102
National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U. S. 350 at
365, 367, 60 S. Ct. 569 (1940).
103
49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 151.
10
4-N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940), Insurance Law,§ 143.
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violation of labor statutes. Benefit would result to no one but the
employer if his were the option, even after the completion of a statutory
collective contract, to hold fast to the substandard wage provisions of
the preceding individual contracts. To permit that would be to make
a mockery of statutory contracts.
But also inherent in the Licorice decision is a recognition of a class
of provisions that supersede the terms of the individual contracts by
reason of their added benefit to the employees. Not every term can
be held to bring about that effect because of its mere insertion into a
collective contract. It is the schedule which is incorporated into the
statute itself. that achieves that effect. Here, the true nature of the
statutory collective contract is once again revealed. The rule of the
Licorice case holds even more true in the case where an unquestionably valid individual contract preceded the statutory collective agreement. It is clear also that in an employees' action based upon the
schedules of a statutory collective contract, the employer would not be
permitted to set up as a defense terms of an individual contract which
were less advantageous to the employee than those of the collective
contract. The denial to the plaintiff of the benefit effected by the concerted action would be tantamount to a denial of the right of selforganization guaranteed by the statutes.
Now it would seem appropriate to examine the effect of subsequenJ
individual employment contracts upon an existing statutory collective
agreement, a question that has only been suggested so far. The legislative history of the National Labor Relations Act is once again of
material assistance on this point. The House Committee Report dealing expressly with that issue, reads as follows: 105
"the majority rule does not preclude adjustment in individual
cases of matters outside of the scope of the basic agreement.106
Second, agreements more favorable to the majority than to the
minority are impossible, for under § 8 (3) any discrimination is
outlawed which tends to 'encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization.'"
The report also deals somewhat with the converse situation:
"On the other hand, if better terms were given to nonmembers,
this would give rise to bitterness and strife. . . . Clearly then,
there must be one basic scale, and it must apply to all."
H. REP. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1935), pp. 21, 20.
That is, as one can see from the report, scales referring to wages and hours,
commonly termed schedules.
105
106
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In other words, whatever terms more advantageous than the schedules
collectively agreed upon an employee may obtain through individual
contracting are to be held lawful, providing that no unfair practices
are involved. To that extent the law tolerates the coexistence of statutory collective bargaining with such individual bargaining as benefits
the employee.
In the Virginian Railway case one of the issues involved was the
scope of the injunctive relief which had been granted. The decree restrained the defendant from entering into any contract concerning rates
of pay, hours, and other working conditions, except with the respondent union. The federal government intervened as amicus curiae
and argued in its brief that neither the statute nor the decree prevented the company from refusing to make a collective contract and
from hiring individuals on whatever terms it might agree upon with
each employee.107 The Supreme Court expressly upheld that contention. In addition it observed that the decree
"is designed only to prevent collective bargaining with anyone ..•
other than respondent ... ascertained to be [the] true representative. . . . [The decree] must be taken to prohibit the negotiation of labor contracts, generally applicable to employees ... but
not as precluding such individual contracts as petitioner may elect
to make directly with individual employees."
There is obviously no inkling of a suggestion here that it is still within
the company's power, if it has signed a collective agreement, to destroy
its efficacy by individual contracting. The Court in the Jones & Laughlin case, particularly as to that issue, leaned heavily upon the Virginian
case and quoted from it at great length. Moreover, in dealing with the
question of the permissibility of individual bargaining, the Court
adopted that portion of the government's brief mentioned above which
insisted upon the employer's freedom in "refusing to make a collective contract and hiring individuals on whatever terms the employer
may determine." 108 The use of the conjunctive "and" in the quoted
portion indicates the freedom in individual contracting which survives
a failure to reach collective agreement.
No authority has thus far interpreted the Jones & Laughlin case
any differently. In accord is the case of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
107
Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 at 548, note
35a, 57 S. Ct. 592 (1937) (quotation from 309 U.S. at 549).
108 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S.
I at 45, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937) (italics ours).
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New York State Labor Relations Board.109 The board in that case had
ordered the company to negotiate "exclusively" with the union as representative of its agents. In enforcing the order the New York Supreme
Court and the Appellate Division eliminated the word "exclusively"
therefrom. The Court of Appeals affirmed, in an opinion which sought
to explain to an apparently upset board and union how "freedom" of
individual bargaining and a collective contract could coexist side by
side. 110 Relying on the above quoted paragraph of the Jones & Laughlin decision, the court failed to see why negotiations with the union on
the one hand, and with the individual employees on the other, might
defeat the policy of the labor statute. In the face of that decision, the
court found further clarification to be superfluous. The New York
court is to be commended, for there is really nothing in the Jones &
Laughlin case authorizing an individual employee to contract upon
a substandard basis.
When it is realized that the impact of statutory collective contracts
upon the individual employment relationship results from the statutory
command itself, the haze surrounding another rather difficult problem
is also lifted. That is the problem of determining the effect of a change
of a collective contract upon each individual employment relationship.
The issue will, of course, hardly arise with respect to any employment
terminable at will. It is the permanent employments, typified by those
with the railway companies, in which changes of these standards have
given and still are giving rise to much controversy. When the employee is a member of the union, the courts, since Shaup v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,111 decided in 1931,
by relying on the law of unincorporated unions, have reached a solution satisfactory to both unions and employers. The Shaup case indicated that even in the case of a nonstatutory collective contract, a change
of the terms directly affected the employment relationship. All the
more must this be true of the modern statutory contract.
109
168 Misc. 948, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 775 (1938), affd. 255 App. Div. 840, 7
N. Y. S. (2d) 1007 (1938) (without opinion), affd. 280 N. Y. 194, 20 N. E. (2d)
390 (1939). The case arose under the New York "Little Wagner Act," N. Y. Consol.
Laws (McKinney, 1940), Labor Law, § 705, which is patterned after the National
Labor Relations Act.
110
There was some vague wording in the opinio:q on the basis of which a case
for the legality of contracting outside of the standard terms might have been made
out, although the interpretation given the opinion by Rice, "The Significance of
Labor Contracts under the National Labor Relations Act," 37 M1cH. L. R&v. 693 at
703 (1939), seems to be unaffected thereby.
111
223 Ala. 202, 135 So. 327 (1931).
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C. Under the Common Law of Collective Contracts
The Shaup case also introduces us to the field of nonstatutory collective contracts, which, although dealt with last herein, are forerunners
of the whole present-day legal concept of collective bargaining. Of
course their early importance has been somewhat lessened today by the
ever-increasing significance of the statutory collective contract. During
their reign, however, there was probably no field of law in which the
opinions of the courts were so at variance. Varied as the opinions were,
they did indicate a definite trend toward the realistic notion of collective bargaining.
One question strikes at the heart of the whole problem. Does a
modification of a collective contract occurring after an employee has
come under its sway require his individual consent in order to be binding upon him? For the answer, let us first examine the changing methods by which the courts have approached the problem. In the very
beginning it was hardly questioned that that consent was a prerequisite. As late as 1934, cases like McCoy v. St. Joseph Belt Railway 112
adopted that line of reasoning in their decisions. 113 Any change in
attitude could not be effected so long as the courts failed to take heed
of the double function of the collective contract. We have seen that
the collective agreement operates in all respects as a normal contract
between the parties to it. But we have seen also that today it affects
the employer-employee relationship by reason of the statutory pro112
229 Mo. App. 506, 77 S. W. (2d) 175 (1934). There were provisions collectively agreed upon, such as seniority rights which were held to become "individual
rights." In the instant case, however, a copy of the collective contract was sent to each
employee of the unit involved therein, which act was tantamount to an individual
contract. In accord, Gordon v. Hawkins, (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 66 S. W. (2d)
432. But see Illinois Central R. R. v. Moore, (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) 112 F. (2d)
959, where the court confused to some extent the requirement of membership in the
absence of which the contract would not be binding, with that of individual acceptance
of the terms of the collective contract.
118
The leading case to this effect is Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry., 198 Ky. 477,
248 S. W. 1042 (1923). The plaintiff claimed his right to a transfer to a "daylight''
run upon the ground of seniority rights allegedly violated by his transfer to another
run after a subsequent agreement between union and company. The dispute arose,
however, between the respective conductors rather than between the plaintiffs and the
railroad, the latter being neutral in the controversy. The court found for the plaintiff.
See also a frequently cited case, West v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 103 W. Va. 417, 137
S. E. 654 (1927) (plaintiff's action against the company for loss of wages dismissed,
upon the ground that the refusal to re-employ him after he had been furloughed
violated only the seniority provisions, which had not been consented to by him individually).
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vision saying that that relationship shall be subject to those terms of the
collective agreement which are ordinarily related thereto. Failing to
perceive this second possible function, the courts looked for some way
through which the individual employee could be brought within the
range of the contract. The case of Piercy v. Louisville & N ash'Ville
Railway 114 therefore reads the collective agreement as a contract for
the benefit of the union member, so that the union cannot deprive him
of the rights acquired under the collective contract.115 There were
slight deviations within this class of cases based upon the doctrine of
the vested rights acquired by a third-party beneficiary. This theory
then went on :fictitiously to impute the consent of that beneficiary, not
only to the basic schedules 116 but also to whatever modifications might
be wrought by a committee provided for that purpose in the contract,117
or by a new agreement.
m 198 Ky. 477, 248 S. W. 1042 (1923).
115

The majority of the state courts in the United States had already sustained
actions brought by donee beneficiaries when, in a few jurisdictions, the courts showed
themselves slightly responsive to individual actions based on collective contracts. See note
in 16 MINN. L. REv. 100 (1931). It seems obvious, therefore, that there was a desire
'to grant some· measure of protection to the contract terms, since the slight recognition
came at a time when collective contracts were generally considered unenforceable. Hinting at that doctrine was St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders' Union, 94 Minn.
351, 102 N. W. 725 (1905), but it had been fully developed in Yazoo & M. V. Ry.
v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931), and Yazoo & M. V. Ry. v. Webb,
(C. C. A. 5th, 1933) 64 F. (2d} 902. In the first-mentioned Yazoo case it was stated
that collective agreements are "primarily for the individual benefit of the members of the
organization and that the rights secured by these contracts are the individual rights
of the individual members of the union, and may be enforced directly by the individual." 161 Miss. 4 at 14. In accord, Rentschler v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 126
Neb. 493, 253 N. W. 694 (1934). In addition see the cases cited in 81 A. L. R.
1271 at 1302 (1932) and 95 A. L. R. IO at 31 et seq. (1935). For a scholarly
adverse criticism of that doctrine, in so far as collective agreements are concern'ed, see
Rice, "Collective Labor Agreement in American Law," 44 HARv. L. REv. 572 at
595 (1931), and Witmer, "Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts," 48 YALE
L. J. 195 at 236 (1938). See also the note in 82 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 283 (1934).
116 However, in Johnson v. American Railway Express Co., 163 S. C. 191, 161
S. E. 4 73 ( 1931), the court dismissed this as a prerequisite, stating that the employee
who is to be considered the "third person," though "perhaps ignorant of the contract,"
nevertheless acquires an enforceable interest in the contract in so far as the provision
benefiting him is concerned. In Hall v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. R., 224 Mo. App.
431, 28 S. W. (2d) 687 (1930), the court likewise was unconcerned with whether or
not the plaintiff, who relied on the collective contract in his action on his own threeyear employment contract, had even been apprised of that collective contract.
117
See, e.g., Order of Railway Conductors v. Jones, 78 Colo. So, 239 P. 882
(1925). The court found for the plaintiff, but only because of the obviously malicious
tendency of that later modification of the collective agreement. See that part of the
text referring to note 146, infra.
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Two more aspects of the collective contract problem remain to be
examined. The first, involving the relationship of the employee to the
collective contract, seeks to determine that class of employees which
is to be within the ambit of the contract made by the employer with
the union. A contention that the union's promises therein were made
with the intent 118 that they should benefit all employees, irrespective
of their membership, was bound to run into difficulties. For the contractual obligation imposed upon the union must needs be executed
through disciplinary measures if necessary.110 Furthermore, from a
purely contractual standpoint, even in the case of a member, it would
seem that, with his resignation from the union, the collective contract
would lose the impact upon his employment. The second aspect of the
problem is related to the first. If the relationship of an individual
employee to a collective contract is that of a third-party beneficiary,
then it would again seem to be left to his choice whether he is to disclaim that relationship.120 As to the first point, the Georgia Court of
Appeals held, indeed, that an employee who had ceased to be a union
member no longer enjoyed the protection of its collective contract.121
And with respect to this second question, certain New York cases seem
to indicate that only if the employee was ignorant of the existence of
a collective agreement, could he recover losses sustained as a result of
a substandard individual agreement. That reasoning is so far consistent
with the usual construction of a contract for the benefit of a third
person.122 Beneficia non obstreduntur.123 Even more will that hold true
118 The intent of the parties determines whether a person can be said to be a
third-party donee-beneficiary. See l CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT,§ 133 (1) (a) (1932).
119 See Schlesinger v. Quinto, II7 Misc. 735, 192 N. Y. S. 564 (1921), affd.
201 App. Div. 487, 194 N. Y. S. 401 (1922), and Weber v. Nasser, (Cal. App.
1930) 286 P. 1074, affd. 210 Cal. 607, 292 P. 637 (1<)30). It was quite proper,
therefore, that in Brooks v. Louisville & N. Ry., 218 Ky. 279, 291 S. W. 371 (1927),
the company set up the defense of want of mutuality in an action brought by a nonmember, See also note 125, infra.
120 See I CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 137 (1932).
121 Gary v. Central of Georgia Ry., 44 Ga. App. 120, 160 S. E. 716 (1931).
The action was for damages suffered by the plaintiff as the result of his discharge,
in alleged violation of the provisions of a collective contract.
122 Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N. Y. S. 952 (1914). See also
Langmade v. Olean Brewing Co., 137 App. Div. 355, 121 N. Y. S. 388 (1910),
where, in addition to plaintiff's membership, an individual arrangement had been made
between him and his employer expressly relying on the regulations of the collective
contract.
123 In entire consistency with that doctrine, to which the court expressly pointed,
was the holding in Huston v. Washington Wood & Coal Co., 4 Wash. (2d) 449, 103
P. (2d) 1095 (1940), that even a member may rightly forego the benefits under the
collective contract by working for substandard wages.
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when nonmembers have been held eligible to be the third-party beneficiaries. Their disclaimer of benefits cannot at all conflict with any duties
towards the union, since nonmembers owe no such duties. All the
weaknesses of that reasoning are illustrated by the opinion in Yazoo
& M. V. Ry. v. Sideboard,1 24 a decision marked by contradictions in
logic. On the one hand, the interest of the union in preventing nonmembers from undercutting the schedules was held to satisfy the
requirement that the promisee be somewhat interested in the performance of the promise for the benefit of the third person; on the other
hand, the acceptance of substandard wages by the nonmember was
found to preclude any recovery of the difference. By permitting the
nonmember to waive all the benefits he might acquire as third-party
beneficiary of the collective contract, the court in effect destroyed the
whole purpose of making him a beneficiary.125
Another crucial issue fortunately resulted in an approach which
makes any resort to fictions unnecessary. Working conditions scheduled
in collective contracts relate not only to the scale of pay to employees
but also to the consideration demanded of them. Payment presupposes
service and loyalty, which in special cases may even involve restrictions
upon competition for a certain period subsequent to the termination of
employment. Just such a provision was contained in an agreement en. tered into by the union and the plaintiff company in a Massachusetts
case.126 The court found that the defendant employee, a member of
the union, was bound by the provision regardless of his knowledge of
12" 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931). See note in 16 MINN. L. REv. JOO (1931).
See also the note in 31 CoL. L. REv. n56 at n59 (1931).
125 This reasoning also renders the return promise of the union valueless as consideration for the employer's promise. See note l 19, supra. Cf. l CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, §§ So and comment, 90 (1932).
126 Whiting Milk Companies v. O'Connell, 277 Mass. 570, 179 N. E. 169
(19-31). Cf. note in 45 HARV. L. REV. 751 (1932) (dealing only with the reasonable
limits on such restrictions). In accord, Whiting Milk Companies v. Grondin, 282
Mass. 41, 184 N. E. 379 (1933). In Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188°
N. E. 705 (1934), the case did not hinge upon such a provision, but rather upon provisions of a collective agreement leaving the adjustment of questions concerning preferential employment, seniority rights, and the like, to a committee. The court completely relied on the rule of the Whiting Milk cases. In contrast to that the former
contractual concept is well illustrated by Aden v. Louisville & N. R. R., (Ky. 1921)
276 S. W. 5n (the modifications and determinations of the collective contract brought
about by the parties thereto were held to affect the seniority rights of the plaintiff,
who, by accepting the benefits of the contract, had also agreed to assume its burdens).
To the same effect is Boucher v. Godfrey, 119 Conn. 622, 178 A. 655 (1935) (by
continuing the employment with knowledge of the changes, the plaintiffs have impliedly accepted them).
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it. Since that is so, the implication is inescapable that there is a rule
of law subjecting the employment contract of a union member to such
terms as have been collectively agreed upon. It matters not whether the
employee has authorized his union to sign the collective contract or to
modify it, or whether he has ratified it. Many constitutions or by-laws
of unions provide for the submission of the proposed terms of a collective contract to a vote of their members. It is not difficult to trace
this remnant of the early days of collective bargaining back to the
confusion which then characterized it.
Now, concrete cases may again present this same question in modern form. To begin with, there is the obvious fact that the tendency
among union members who feel that they have been aggrieved by an
act of their union affecting their employment is not to proceed against
their employer. On the contrary, the trend is to bring actions against
their unions to recover for that which, in so far as their relationship to
the employer is considered, has now become irretrievable. It is to be
noted in this respect that when the plaintiff in Order of Railway Conductors v. Jones 121 had been discharged pursuant to a determination
concerning his seniority rights, as provided in the collective contract,
he brought an action against the union. In Gordon v. Hawkins 128
wherein seniority rights were again involved, the appellate court dismissed the injunction granted below against the union; the reversal
was based on the ground that seniority rights have been said to rest
upon individual employment contracts.
There is a clear distinction between the status of the employee as
regards the employer with whom his union has bargained on the one
hand, and that status which is represented by his union membership
on the other. When a member charges that the union, in bargaining
with his employer, has violated his rights and privileges as guaranteed
by the union constitution and by-laws,129 a question of membership
rights arises.180 Incidentally, it might be argued that under the "aggre78 Colo. 80, 239 P. 882 (1925).
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 66 S. W. (2d) 432.
129
See, for example, Cameron v. International Alliance, II9 N. J. Eq. 577,
183 A. 157 (1936), cert. den. 298 U.S. 659, 56 S. Ct. 681 (1936); Pratt v. Rudisule, 249 App. Div. 305, 292 N. Y. S. 68 (1936).
130
The administration of its rules is primarily left to its own agencies and boards
owing to the contractual nature of the membership. For the limitation on judicial
review of the activities of those tribunals, see the text referring to note 142, infra, and
Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 177 N. E. 833 (1931). Beyond those limits,
liability is dependent on tort concepts. For cases in point, see note 117, supra, and note
144, infra.
121
128
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gate" theory,131 a union member is precluded from maintammg an
action against the union, which, being the embodiment of all its members, includes the plaintiff himself. 132 In any event the criterion by which
the validity of that bargaining with the employer must be judged is
the legal capacity of the union to bargain collectively. It has long been
well settled that this capacity is an incident of any true labor union.133
Even in a case where there is involved an adjustment of a matter personal to the employee, if that matter has been delegated to the union,
its officers, or its tribunals, their adjustment or modification is binding
on the employee. This particular factual situation is illustrated perfectly by the Shaup case 134 and other railroad cases 185 in which the
matters collectively agreed upon involved rights to promotion and
other so-called seniority rights of employees. The rule of law represented by these cases is to the effect that rights created by the collective
contract are subject to being vacated by the consent of the parties to
the collective contract. The courts have, therefore, held that the
discharge of a union member in accordance with a modification of that
term of a collective agreement is exclusively governed by that modification.
181 For the failings of this conception of unincorporated associations, see Chafee,
"The Internal Affairs of Associations not for Profit," 43 HARV. L. REv. 993 at 1010
(1930).
182 Storms v. United Grain and Millworkers' Union, 64 Ohio App. 19, 27 N. E.
(2d) 781 (1940); McClees v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 59 Ohio App. 477, 18 N. E. (2d) 812 (1938) (a member's action against the
union to recover on the ground of failure of its officers to fix hours and seniority rights
dismissed, on the theory that he was suing himself, pro tanto).
188 Cf. particularly, American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council,
257 U. S. 184 at 209, 42 S. Ct. 72 (1921). See also the reference to "collective bargaining as the prime objective of all union" in W1TTE, THE GoVERNMENT IN LABOR
DISPUTES 14 (1932).
184 Shaup v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 223 Ala.
202, 135 So. 327 (1931). The court dismissed the action, brought upon the ground
that a ruling of the committee of adjustment affecting the collective contract regulations
violated plaintiff's seniority rights acquired under that contract.
185 See the General Committee of Adjustment referred to in the agreement involved in Long v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 155 Md. 265, 141 A. 504 (1928). See also,
Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N.E. 705 (1934) (modifications of a collective
contract regulating seniority rights, discharges, and the like, held binding upon members); Aulich v. Craigmyle, 248 Ky. 676, 59 S. W. (2d) 560 (1933) (interpretation
of seniority rights determined fir.st in by-laws to which the collective contract referred,
held binding upon member). In accord, Ryan v. New York Central R.R., 267 Mich.
202, 255 N. W. 365 (1934).
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A very recent Michigan case, Hartley v. Brotherhood 186 is illustrative of all the points involved in this general question. There the
plaintiff employee, a married woman, was a member of the union with
which her employer, the railroad, had collectively contracted. Although
as a member she had acquired certain seniority rights, she was nevertheless dismissed pursuant to a provision of a subsequent cqllective
agreement entitling the company to discharge married women. After
she had unsuccessfully appealed to the various tribunals of the union,
she brought an action against the union for damages on the theory
that the union had no right to enter into an agreement whereby rights
created by a former collective agreement were wiped out. Said the
court: 187
"The seniority rights acquired by her did not arise by virtue
of her contract of employment with her employer, but existed by
reason of the agreement of I 92 I between the railway and the
brotherhood.138 This agreement was executed for the benefit of
all the members of the brotherhood and not for the individual
benefit of plaintiff. When, by reason of changed economic circumstances, it became apparent that the earlier agreement should
be modified in the general interest of all members of the brotherhood, it was within the power of the latter to do so, notwithstanding the result thereof to plaintiff. The brotherhood had the
power by agreement with the railway to create seniority rights
of plaintiff, and it likewise by the same method has the power to
modify or destroy these rights in the interest of all of the members."
The Ryan case, cited therein, had relied upon and reiterated the
Shaup case doctrine, as had various other cases in New York,1 30 Massachusetts, and Alabama. 140
186

283 Mich. 201, 277 N. W. 885 (1938).
Id., 283 Mich. at 206.
188
Citing Ryan v. New York Central R. R., 267 Mich. 202, 255 N. W. 365
(1934).
189
O'Keefe v. Local 463, United Assn. of Plumbers, 277 N. Y. 300, 14 N. E.
(2d) 77 (1938) (facts stated, note 53, supra); East Chester Cleaners v. Platek,
(S. Ct. 1936) 95 N. Y. L. J. 2438.
140
See the cases cited in notes 126, 134 and 136, supra. The Illinois case,
Western-United Dairy Co. v. Nash, 293 Ill. App. 162, 12 N. E. (2d) 47 (1937),
is not completely in point, although facts and results are identical to those in the
Whiting Milk cases cited in note 126, supra. The Illinois court, however, saw fit to
refer not only to the plaintiff's membership, but also to his knowledge of the provisions
187
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At the bottom of these cases is legal logic typical of any attempt
to deal with a new judicial phenomenon. The law, recognizing and
even favoring collective bargaining as the primary union activity,
construes the instrument so that it will best accomplish the end sought.
True, through their own constitutions and by-laws, the unions, like
juristic persons, have to a certain extent been vested with a broad
discretion in the interpretation and administration of their own rules.
The member, as has often been stated, in connecting himself with the
union subjects himself to its rules of administration.141 And within the
limits of due process, public policy and the laws of the land, judicial
review is excluded from the particular field, governed by its own
autonomous rules.142 But the binding effect of those rules of internal
management is dependent upon the contractual relationship represented
by membership in the union, and would seem therefore to be limited to
the union on the one hand and its members on the other.143 The employment relationship goes beyond those limits and collective bargaining would imply a power of the union to create provisions governing
the conditions of that employment.
The courts, as a line of recent cases seem to indicate, have found
a satisfactory solution to this problem. It is represented by that basic
rule of law that the schedules of the collective contract are to be incorporated into each member's employment contract. It is a court-made
rule which finds its parallel in the statutory rule discussed earlier.
Quite recently, the New Yark Court of Appeals in O'Keefe v. Local
463, United Association of Plumbers 144 advanced the argument that
it is even within the power of the union to force an employer to discharge members in good standing. The union acted, in this case, pursuant to the,recommendation of a joint board established by the colof the collective contract. The New Jersey case, Franklin v. Pennsylvania-Reading
Seashore Lines, 122 N. J. Eq. 205, 193 A. 712 (1937), refers to a collective contract
established under the Railway Labor Act which explains its extension to nonmembers.
141 See Shaup v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 223
Ala. 202, 135 So. 327 (1931); Aulich v. Craigmyle, 248 Ky. 676, 59 S. W. (2d)
560 (1933). See also Simpson v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, 83 W. Va. 355, 98 S. E. 580 (1919).
142
For more cases, see the citations in Long v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 155 Md.
265, 141 A. 504 (1928).
148 For this kind of limitation, see ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING, 2d ed. 319
(1930).
144
277 N. Y. 300, 14 N. E. (2d) 77 (1938), mentioned in 1940 Wis. L. REV.
300 at 302 (facts stated, note 53, supra).
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lective agreement. The case proves once again that it is a misconception to consider a union member as the third-party beneficiary of a
collective contract. The court was explicit in stating that
"The objects sought by a union and the 'unity of action' to achieve
them cannot be attained without some harm to the individual.
The tests of whether the law affords redress for such harm are
the legality, good faith and freedom from malice of the union." 145
And, in the Hartley case discussed above the Michigan court took the
same view, leaving the union free to bargain collectively without regard
to the terms of an earlier collective agreement, and restricting it only
to the limitations of "bad faith, arbitrary action or fraud." 146
Thus, we have seen that the law 147 establishes its control over the
conditions of employment of union members by means of the collective
contract. This control consists of the setting up of minimum standards,
with respect to wages and other terms, for the individual bargaining
between the employer and the union member. It therefore tolerates no
substandard terms to which both might possibly agree.148 The law subjects the individual relationship to the standards collectively agreed
upon because of the presumption 149 that the union in collectively bargaining will seek the "benefit of all the members." 150 The burden of
rebutting that presumption, by showing that the union was motivated
by considerations other than the promotion of the welfare of the memId., 277 N. Y. at 309.
Hartley v. Brotherhood, 283 Mich. 201 at 207, 277 N. W. 885 (1938).
Also exactly in point is Bucko v. Murray, 170 Misc. 902, II N. Y. S. (2d) 402
(1939), affd. without opinion, 258 App. Div. 867, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 537 (1939).
Here a restraining order was granted against a referendum on a new collective agreement, which sought to wipe out the seniority rights of men continuously employed for
twelve and one-half years by excluding them from voting. Only those employees had
been given the right to vote on the new terms who had quit the service at a time prior
to 1926 but who had returned to it at any time prior to January II, 1939.
147 Witmer, "Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts," 48 YALE L. J. 195
at 226 (1938), points to the identity of the ends sought by both a minimum wage
statute and by collective contracts, which he thinks should result in treating the latter
just like statutory regulations. But is he not begging the question inasmuch as this
equality of treatment could only come as the result of a legal command?
148 Reichert v. Quindazzi, {Mun. Ct. 1938) 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 284. The cases cited
in Witmer, "Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts," 48 YALE L. J. 195 at 225,
note IOI (1938), are related only to regulations in minimum wage statutes.
149 Shaup v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 223 Ala.
202, 135 So. 327 (1931).
150 Hartley v. Brotherhood, 283 Mich. 201 at 206, 277 N. W. 885 (1938).
145
146
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hers,151 lies on the contestant. The conclusions to which the courts have
come in the last decade presuppose that no "individual" rights are
acquired by the member from the terms of the collective contract to
which he has been subjected.152 The courts are careful to point out
that no membership rights are involved in the course of collective
bargaining, no matter to what extent the employment relationship is
affected.158 Thus, the membership is only the conditio sine qua the
terms of the collective contract could not obtain control over the employments of the union members. Loss of membership eliminates that
control over them, and thereby results in a loss of the protection afforded by the collective contract.154 The parties are free, of course, to
continue their employment relationship unless the collective contract
conditions employment upon membership, but then the situation
would hardly be different from that of a nonmember whose terms of
employment have been based upon the terms of a collective contract.
The reason for their application, then, is not to be found in a rule of
law, but in a voluntary, i.e., contractual, act.155 The counterpart of that
situation arises when the contractual function of a collective contract
is rendered ineffective by a judgment declaring, for example, that the
closed-shop provision therein is monopolistic and, therefore, invalid.
The terms bearing upon each individual employment relationship are

151 That point is stressed in O'Keefe v. Local 463, United Assn. of Plumbers, 277
N. Y. 300, 14 N. E. (2d) 77 (1938).
152 It is so held, expressly, in Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N. E. 705
(1934). Furthermore, the opinions in the O'Keefe and the Hartley cases, supra, notes
150 and 151, and prior to them in the Shaup case, supra, note 149, and in Ryan
v. New York Central R.R., 267 Mich. 202, 255 N. W. 365 (1934), relied upon this
argument. But see George T. Ross Lodge No. 831 v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 191 Minn. 373, 254 N. W. 590 (1934) (self-contradictory because, on the
one hand, it gives effect to modifications of the collective agreement relating to the
employment terms, and on the other hand, states that the schedules formerly collectively
agreed upon had created "individual rights").
153 Cf. this quotation from O'Keefe v. Local 463, United Assn. of Plumbers, 277
N. Y. 300 at 309, 14 N. E. (2d) 77 (1938): "These provisions [by-laws and constitution] have no application here. The plaintiffs have not ••• suffered any deprivation
of membership rights. The right to retain a job is not a membership right."
154

Gary v. Central of Georgia Ry., 44 Ga. App. 120, 160 S. E. 716 (1931).

Thus in Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Webb, (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) 64 F. (2d)
902, and Yazoo & M. V. Ry. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931), the
argument ran that the terms of the collective agreement provided for their extension to
nonmembers, an~ that therefore their relationships had been governed ever since in
accordance with the terms of the collective contract.
155
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not affected by the invalidity of that provision.156 The dual aspect of
the collective contract clears the way for its divisibility.
In summing up we can see that there is no magic in the similarity
of the law concerning nonstatutory collective contracts to that of
statutory ones. The critical decade just passed demanded organization in the field of competition. In the dictatorships, the solution was
naturally an authoritarian one. The law of collective contract has been
the contribution of the democracies to this basic social problem. There
was no longer room for the operation of variegated doctrines, wherein
the only constant was change. The judiciary as well as the legislature
sought a realistic and workable approach to the intricate problems involved. A solution lay waiting. In some jurisdictions the judicial empiricism anticipated statutory regulation. However, in other jurisdictions the philosophy underlying the labor relations statutes may
have exerted considerable influence upon the judicial aspect of nonstatutory contracts as well.
156
F. F. East Co. v. United Oystermen's Union, (N. J. Ch. 1940) 15 A. (2d)
129 at 134 (wherein the court pointed out the divisibility of collective contracts and,
therefore, upheld its schedules in spite of the invalidity of its other provisions).

